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I. Introduction
Integration of immigrant populations is an urgent and fundamental policy challenge in many countries
in Europe and the Americas that have experienced dramatic increases in the size and diversity of their
immigrant populations in recent decades. There is agreement that it is economically wasteful and
democratically deficient if immigrants remain marginalized. From a purely economic framework, where
returns to the free movement of labor are strongly positive, we should not observe integration failure
once transition costs are paid. But this theoretical expectation is not uniformly realized across countries
and immigrant groups (Dancygier and Laitin 2014). Instead, the extraordinary influx of migrants has
led to severe social tensions and stark signals of integration failures. On the one hand, we see alienation
and hardship among immigrants who face social exclusion and discrimination (Bloemraad, Korteweg
and Yurdakul 2008; Algan et al. 2012). On the other hand, we see anti-immigrant backlash among
natives who fear that the new waves of immigrants will threaten their jobs, security, and national
culture (Fetzer 2000).
Faced with this conundrum, policy makers are struggling with the design of policies to facilitate
integration and ease social tensions, but we know distressingly little about their impacts. One of the
key debates involves immigrants’ access to citizenship and the consequences that naturalization has
on integrating the growing immigrant populations into the political, social, and economic fabric of the
host democracies. The citizenship frameworks are under much scrutiny by legislators, scholars, and
members of civil society who engage in heated debates about the merits of policies that promote or
limit opportunities for naturalization (Howard 2005; Dancygier 2010; Goodman 2010).
One paradigm—often advanced by parties on the left—is that naturalization should be made fairly
accessible since it provides immigrants with the necessary incentives and resources to integrate and
invest in a future in the host country. Citizenship is seen as an important catalyst that propels the
integration process. The opposing paradigm—often advanced by parties on the right—holds that
naturalization has no independent effect on enhancing integration. Quite the opposite, once you
hand over the host country passport, immigrants lose the incentive to integrate because they can
no longer be excluded from the benefits that are associated with citizenship. Following this logic,
naturalization is not a catalyst but merely a reward for immigrants who have reached the end point
of the integration process. As Dutch Minister of Home Affairs Piet Hein Donner recently put it in
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defense of tightening naturalization rules, “citizenship is the crown on participation and integration
into society.”1 Accordingly, there should be a high bar that restricts access to citizenship to only those
immigrants who earned this reward by successfully completing the integration process.
In this paper we contribute to the ongoing debate by providing empirical answers to three unre-
solved questions: Does naturalization promote the long-term social integration of immigrants into the
host country society? Is naturalization more or less effective for more marginalized immigrant groups?
Is naturalization more or less effective when immigrants naturalize earlier rather than later into their
residency period? Answering these questions is crucial to test scholarly theories and inform ongo-
ing debates about the design of naturalization policy. But despite the imminent importance of these
questions for policy and theory there is a paucity of research that provides reliable evidence on the
causal impacts of naturalization or the impact of the timing of naturalization on the social integration
of immigrants. The large majority of studies of naturalization only examine its impact on economic
outcomes, and the few existing studies that move beyond economic outcomes almost exclusively fo-
cus on political integration, but do not examine social integration specifically. Social integration of
immigrants is important for at least two reasons. First, successful social integration—understood as
the removal of all barriers to full participation in the host society—is a key factor for immigrants and
their offspring to achieve social, but also political and economic, mobility in their host society. Second,
the increased influx of immigrants has raised concerns that diversity might have a negative effect on
the receiving countries social capital (Putnam 2007) and social cohesion (Giddens 2007). Here, social
integration of immigrants is widely seen as the most important factor for the maintenance of social
cohesion in times of increasing diversity (Hooghe et al. 2009; Kesler and Demireva 2011). Further-
more, existing studies also only consider short-term effects and, most importantly, they do not employ
experimental or quasi-experimental strategies that would allow them to isolate the independent effect
of naturalization from the non-random selection into naturalization or the non-random selection into
the timing of the naturalization (Hainmueller, Hangartner and Pietrantuono (2015)).
The key problem faced by all studies of naturalization is that naturalized citizenship is not randomly
assigned, but results from a complex double selection process. Immigrants first apply for naturalization
based on unobserved characteristics such as motivation or information, and then decision makers screen
applicants based on another set of unobserved characteristics such as the immigrant’s language ability
1“Becoming Dutch to be difficult,” The Daily Herald, (2011, March 29).
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or the impression made during the application interview. As a result of this double selection bias,
the group of naturalized and non-naturalized immigrants differ on a myriad of omitted variables that
independently affect integration, but are difficult to measure and control for in any statistical analysis.
Unless we remove the differences in the omitted variables, we cannot attribute differences in integration
outcomes to the effect of naturalization.
In this paper we contribute to the ongoing debate by providing new causal estimates of the effects
of naturalization on the long-term social integration of immigrants, estimates of how the naturalization
effect varies across immigrant groups, and estimates of the effect of the timing of the naturalization.
Our study design is based on a natural experiment in Switzerland where until 2003 some municipalities
used secret ballot referendums to decide on the naturalization applications of its immigrant residents.
Leaflets that describe the applicants were sent out to all local voters who then voted with a ‘yes’
or ‘no’ decision to accept or reject each individual applicant and immigrants that gained a majority
of ‘yes’ votes received Swiss citizenship. Our data combines the leaflets and voting records with a
recently administered survey that measures the current integration levels of the applicants who faced
naturalization referendums prior to 2003. Given the long time gap between the referendums and our
survey, immigrants in our sample received Swiss citizenship about 15 years ago on average. As we
explain in detail below, this original data and unique setting allows us to get at long-term effects
of naturalization and remove the bias from the double selection process using two complementary
identification strategies that are based on an instrumental variable design and a fuzzy regression
discontinuity design, respectively. Moreover, it allows us to apply an identification strategy to estimate
the effect of an early versus late timing of the naturalization.
Our study yields three main results. First, we find that naturalization strongly improved the long-
term social integration of immigrants as measured by our integration scale that combines a variety of
outcomes including whether immigrants have plans to permanently stay in Switzerland, are a member
of a local social club, feel discriminated against, and read Swiss newspapers instead of newspapers
from their origin countries. These positive effects of naturalization on social integration persist for
more than a decade and a half and are robust across various robustness checks. The effects are also
sizable. For example, when using our summary scale of social integration that combines all outcome
measures, the results suggest that naturalization causes about a full standard deviation unit increase
in the social integration scale.
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Second, we find that the naturalization effect strongly varies by the immigrant group. In particular,
the estimates show that the large positive effects of naturalization on integration are concentrated
among the most marginalized immigrant groups, including immigrants from Turkey and the former
Yugoslavia and immigrants born abroad as opposed to those born in Switzerland.
Third, we find that the integration returns are larger when immigrants naturalize earlier, rather
than later in their residency. Comparing otherwise similar applicants, we find that receiving Swiss
citizenship about three years earlier translates into about one sixth of a standard deviation unit
increase in the social integration scale. This suggests that receiving the host country citizenship just a
few years faster can have a lasting impact on enhancing the long-term social integration of immigrants.
Our study makes four main contributions. First, our findings contribute to the ongoing heated
debates about the effects of naturalization on immigrant integration. In particular, our new causal
estimates are supportive of the paradigm arguing that naturalization is an important policy instrument
that has a strong and lasting independent effect on improving the social integration of immigrants.
Naturalization acts as a catalyst, rather than merely a crown on the completed integration process.
Moreover, in stark contrast to the political rhetoric mobilizing for limiting access to host country
citizenship with longer residency periods and stricter naturalization criteria, we find that the positive
effects of naturalization are in fact larger for the most marginalized groups and when immigrants
naturalize earlier, rather than later, in their residency. Taken together, these findings suggest that for
Switzerland—and perhaps other countries with similarly restrictive or more restrictive naturalization
regimes—marginally lowering the long residency requirements and stringent naturalization criteria
might well be quite beneficial to reap the full integration gains from the citizenship policy.
When interpreting our results it is important to emphasize that our estimates capture the effects
of naturalization only among immigrants who have applied for citizenship. Among this sample, which
is arguably the most relevant for current policy, we find that naturalization promotes long-term social
integration and that these effects are larger for more marginalized immigrants and those who apply
earlier. This pattern suggests that our results provide a lower bound of the naturalization effects that
we might expect if policy-makers where to marginally lower the threshold to open naturalization for
immigrants who are slightly less integrated or have slightly shorter residency.
Second, while existing work is focused on economic integration our study broadens the scope and
shows that citizenship also has important consequences for social integration of immigrants. This is an
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important result given the persistent marginalization of immigrants and rising social tensions between
immigrants and natives that are visible in many European countries.
Third, given that the average naturalized immigrant in our sample obtained Swiss citizenship about
15 years ago, our study goes beyond short-term effects to consider the lasting impacts of naturalization.
Importantly, the long-term effects of naturalization are key elements for evaluating theories and the
full integration gains from citizenship policy.
Fourth, our study fills an important gap by providing evidence on the effects of naturalization in
Switzerland specifically, a country where the issue of naturalization is particularly pressing: there is
an unusually large immigrant population of about 27% and heated policy debates have seen right wing
parties like the Swiss People’s party mobilize against mass naturalization of immigrants.
II. Does Naturalization Lead to Better Immigrant Integration?
Immigrants who naturalize gain access to important legal rights and privileges that are often restricted
to citizens of the host country (Baubo¨ck et al. 2006; Joppke 2010; OECD 2011; Aleinikoff and Klus-
meyer 2011). For example, while non-naturalized immigrants who are permanent residents typically
have some security of residence and protection against expulsion, only immigrants who become citizens
enjoy the full protection by the state at home and abroad and gain unrestricted access to the territory
of the state with the right to permanent abode and return. As Vink, Prokic-Breuer and Dronkers
(2013, pg. 2) put it, “naturalization ultimately transforms a foreigner into a citizen.” By naturaliz-
ing, immigrants also typically acquire other important privileges such as the right to vote and run for
political office, access to restricted public sector jobs, access to various government benefits for welfare,
education, or health care that might be restricted to citizens, and increased travel mobility afforded
by the host country passport. Naturalization also typically makes it easier for immigrants to sponsor
other family members and secure citizenship for them. For example, in countries such as Switzerland
that do not award citizenship based on place of birth, immigrant children obtain Swiss citizenship at
birth only if their parents are naturalized. In sum, “national citizenship is the highest standard of
equal treatment because immigrants become citizens with all the same rights, same responsibilities,
and same voice in a democracy” (Baubo¨ck et al. 2013, pg. 40).
A growing literature has investigated how naturalization might affect the subsequent integration
of immigrants. The overwhelming majority of these studies examine the effects of naturalization on
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economic outcomes such as employment, wages, or welfare reliance (see, for example, Bevelander
and DeVoretz (2008); OECD (2011); Dancygier and Laitin (2014)). Naturalization may improve the
economic outcomes of immigrants through several mechanisms given that citizenship has both an
instrumental and a psychological dimension (Bloemraad, Korteweg and Yurdakul 2008; Just and An-
derson 2012). Both of these dimensions are not mutually exclusive. Instrumentally, naturalization
gives immigrants access to jobs that are only open to citizens. Citizenship can also act as a signal
that may convince employers that an immigrant applicant has higher levels of human capital (such as
language skills) or has a lower likelihood of return migration. As a result, employers might be more
likely to hire or promote naturalized immigrants and invest in their training. On the psychological
dimension, naturalization might affect the identity of immigrants such that they feel a greater attach-
ment to the host country, feel more security and higher self-efficacy, and change their time horizons
towards investing in a future in the host country. This could empower immigrants to demand higher
wages or search for better jobs (Bevelander and DeVoretz 2008). Consistent with these mechanisms
many studies find that naturalization tends to improve the economic prospects of immigrants, although
some findings have shown quite limited or no effects.2
While numerous studies have examined economic outcomes, the effects of naturalization on the so-
cial and political integration of immigrants remains relatively unexplored even though there are several
theoretical mechanisms through which naturalization might affect these other important dimensions of
immigrant integration (Geddes 2003; Baubo¨ck 2004; Bloemraad, Korteweg and Yurdakul 2008; Kesler
and Demireva 2011; Turcotte 2011; Just and Anderson 2012; Avitabile, Clots-Figueras and Masella
2013; Bevelander and Spang 2014). Similar to the mechanisms that can lead to better economic
integration, naturalization might provide immigrants with the necessary incentives and resources to
invest more heavily in their political and social integration to build a better future in the host country
for themselves and their children. On the instrumental dimension, naturalization gives immigrants
the right to vote and thereby provides an incentive and opportunity for immigrants to become more
politically engaged and informed to voice their preferences and grievances in the democratic process
2See, for example, Chiswick (1978); Bevelander (2000); Bratsberg, Ragan and Nasir (2002); Bevelander and DeVoretz
(2008); Mazzolari (2009); Steinhardt (2012); OECD (2011); Dancygier and Laitin (2014). For Switzerland specifically
one study found that at least among immigrants from non-OECD countries, naturalized immigrants have better labour
market outcomes compared to non-naturalized immigrants (Steinhardt and Wedemeier 2012). Moreover, a CV experi-
ment documented differences in contact rates for naturalized and non-naturalized immigrants which suggests that Swiss
citizenship may be beneficial for immigrants to reduce labour market discrimination (Fibbi, Kaya and Piguet 2003).
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(Bevelander and Pendakur 2011; Just and Anderson 2012; Bevelander and Spang 2014; Hainmueller,
Hangartner and Pietrantuono 2015). Similarly, naturalization might give immigrants an incentive to
invest into improving their social integration as their time horizons shift and they can now be certain
to enjoy the long term gains from better social integration in the host country. These investments
could be in the form of higher civic engagement, social capital, and increased interactions with natives
as immigrants start putting down deeper roots in the host country (Westholm, Montero and van Deth
2007; Bevelander and Veenman 2008; Kesler and Demireva 2011). On the psychological dimension,
naturalization might “encourage people to internalize the democratic ideals of active citizenship” (Just
and Anderson 2012, pg. 7) and therefore result in a more active political and social engagement of
immigrants. Moreover, naturalization can also act to signal acceptance and thereby lead to increased
attachment to the host country because immigrants feel recognized by state authorities as on par
with rooted natives. On the flip side, citizenship might lead natives to recognize immigrants as their
equals and if immigrants feel less discriminated against they might be more likely to interact with
natives socially, increase their community participation, and develop a shared sense of belonging to
the country (Wunderlich 2005; Bevelander 2011; Kesler and Demireva 2011; Westholm, Montero and
van Deth 2007; Baubo¨ck et al. 2013; Keller, Gathmann and Monscheuer 2015; Aptekar 2015). As
Banulescu-Bogdan (2012) puts it “citizenship is a significant milestone for immigrants: a ‘rite of pas-
sage’ to signal that newcomers take their rights and responsibilities seriously, and are to be recognized
as full members of the community.” And lastly, better economic integration might also lead to more
social integration as immigrants can climb the social ladder and gain access to jobs, social activities, or
residential areas that are typically dominated by rooted natives and increased economic status might
lower the reservations of rooted natives against immigrants (Dustmann 1996; Keller, Gathmann and
Monscheuer 2015).
But there are also various theoretical reasons to expect that naturalization itself might do little
to improve or may even reduce the social and political integration of immigrants (DeSipio 1996; Oers
and Hart 2006; Bloemraad 2006). First, immigrants who are eligible for naturalization typically hold
permanent resident permits which already give them a high degree of certainty that they can remain
in the host country for as long as they wish. Given their status as permanent residents they also often
have many of the same benefits and rights as citizens (Dancygier and Laitin 2014). For example, in
Switzerland, permanent residents have access to the same educational, health, and welfare benefits and
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social rights, the right to choose their employers, the right to travel and return, and the responsibility
to pay taxes. Therefore naturalization might do little to shift immigrants’ time horizons even further
towards investing in a long-term future in the host country. More broadly, some have argued that in a
postnational era where rights and privileges are increasingly extended to non-citizens on the basis of
personhood and human rights, naturalization has become epiphenomenal since citizenship is no longer
required for immigrants to exercise their rights and duties as active social, political, and economic
actors in the host polity (Soyal 1994).
Second, much research has shown that habits for social and political engagement are fairly sticky
and often form during adolescence and therefore we might expect little change later in life just because
immigrants obtain the host country passport (Galston 2001; Jennings and Niemi 2014). Even though
naturalization might give immigrants new opportunities to participate, this does not mean that they
will actually make use of these opportunities.
Third, one might argue that naturalization if anything knocks out the incentive of immigrants to
further integrate into the host society, because once they are naturalized they enjoy the same rights as
natives and are no longer incentivized to further integrate by the prospect of earning access to these
rights (Banulescu-Bogdan 2012).
Finally, if discrimination against immigrants is deeply entrenched in the host country society then
we expect that simply awarding immigrants the host country passport will do little to eradicate
the marginalization that immigrants face. In fact, the rooted natives might not view naturalized
immigrants as true equals, especially in a jus sanguinis citizenship regime like Switzerland where
“true” citizenship is passed on by the citizenship of Swiss parents. If naturalized immigrants—like
the rhetoric of some right wing parties suggests—are simply regarded as undeserving foreigners who
“stole” a Swiss passport then we would not expect that barriers to social integration are easily overcome
by naturalization.3 In fact, it might even backfire if newly naturalized immigrants grow increasingly
disappointed and alienated as they learn that even with the Swiss passport they are still regarded as
inferior by the mainstream host country society.
These opposing theoretical perspectives echo in the heated policy discussion about the design of
design of naturalization policy. These debates are characterized by two conflicting policy paradigms
3In recent years the Swiss People’s Party ran campaigns that encouraged voters to stop “mass-naturalizations” using
posters that showed the hands of foreigners stealing Swiss passports.
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(see, for example, Oers and Hart (2006); Ersanilli and Koopmans (2011); Banulescu-Bogdan (2012);
Baubo¨ck et al. (2013)). In the first paradigm, naturalization is seen as a catalyst that promotes
integration because it gives immigrants the resources and incentives to integrate into the host country
society. This logic suggests that immigrants should be given fairly easy access to citizenship by having
low requirements for naturalization. In the opposing paradigm, naturalization itself does nothing to
improve integration, but it is the prospect of obtaining the host country citizenship that motivates
immigrants to integrate in the first place. In other words, naturalization is not regarded as a catalyst for
promoting integration, but a crowing achievement awarded to immigrants for successfully completing
the integration process. This reasoning suggests that there should be a high bar such that only well
integrated immigrants are eligible for naturalization. As one Swiss politician recently put it, the path
to naturalization should be a “marathon”, not a “short distance run” and the Swiss passport is simply
the “title on the i of integration” for immigrants who successfully completed the long and arduous
integration process.4
The theoretical and policy discussions also raise the important question of potential effect het-
erogeneity. It might well be that the effect of naturalization is not uniform across immigrants, but
contingent upon the immigrants’ characteristics (Bloemraad 2006; Just and Anderson 2012; Avitabile,
Clots-Figueras and Masella 2013). For whom might naturalization be most or least effective? On the
one hand, it might be that naturalization is particularly beneficial for immigrants who are socially
marginalized prior to naturalization, since they otherwise lack the necessary resources to invest in
social integration. Similarly, if naturalization enhances integration because it reduces discrimination
from natives who are more likely to recognize naturalized immigrants as equals, then we might expect
that naturalization has a stronger positive effect for more marginalized immigrants who face more
discrimination in the absence of naturalization. On the other hand, it might be that naturalization is
least effective for the most marginalized immigrants because they are not yet sufficiently well equipped
to take advantage of the rights and benefits that come with naturalization. Moreover, less marginalized
immigrants might benefit more from naturalization if they face fewer barriers and are able to invest
more heavily into integration and reap higher returns from their investments.
Another important under-explored issue is the effect of the timing of the naturalization. Countries
vary considerably in the length of the required residency period for naturalization and there are
4Flu¨ckiger, J. (2013, September 17). Sta¨nderat will die Hu¨rden fu¨r Einbu¨rgerungen senken. Neue Zu¨rcher Zeitung.
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vibrant debates about the likely consequences of giving immigrants earlier or later access to the host
country citizenship. The catalyst paradigm argues for easy access and early naturalizations, because
if naturalization acts as a catalyst for integration then getting it earlier rather than later is more
effective to foster the integration of immigrants because they are incentivized early on to integrate
and have a longer time to benefit from having citizenship. The crown paradigm argues for long
residency requirements and a high bar for access to naturalization because only immigrants who are
well integrated deserve the host country passport and are sufficiently well equipped to take advantage
of host country citizenship. If citizenship simply acts to knock out the incentive for immigrants
to integrate in order to earn access to naturalization, then handing out citizenship too early will if
anything lower the expected integration compared to the a scenario where naturalizations are restricted
to immigrants who have been in the country long enough to have gained at least some integration level.
In sum, there are opposing theoretical expectations and heated policy debates about the poten-
tial effects of naturalization and the effects of the timing of the naturalization on the integration of
immigrants. The existing literature on the impacts of naturalization has mostly focused on economic
outcomes and the smaller literature that goes beyond economic outcomes mostly focuses on the effects
of naturalization on political integration. We still know distressingly little about how naturalization
effects the social integration of immigrants let alone what the long-term effects are on social integra-
tion or how the effects vary across groups or with the timing of the naturalization. In this study we
contribute towards filling this gap.
A. Double Selection Bias
Perhaps the major shortcoming of the existing evidence is that it suffers from potentially severe selec-
tion bias (Dancygier and Laitin 2014; Kesler and Demireva 2011). In order to isolate the causal effect
of naturalization, we need to compare two groups of immigrants that differ in their naturalization
status, but are otherwise similar on all other characteristics that can independently affect integration.
The fundamental problem is that such a comparison is hard to come by empirically with typical obser-
vational data, because there is a complex two stage selection bias that determines which immigrants
obtain citizenship.5
5Note that by using the term double selection “bias” we refer to the statistical meaning of word bias, rather than a
discriminatory bias in who gets naturalized. We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this distinction.
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Figure 1 illustrates the two stages in the double selection process. In the first stage immigrants
choose to apply for naturalization or not and this decision is based on a whole host of reasons that have
independent effects on integration. For starters, only immigrants who are sufficiently motivated and
have the resources to apply for naturalization will obtain citizenship, while the group of non-naturalized
immigrants contains many immigrants who lacked the resources or motivation to apply for citizenship
in the first place. Arguably, the motivation and resources to apply are among the most important
confounders when trying to estimate the effects of citizenship because the resources and motivation
to apply are strong determinants of integration into the host country. In addition, there are many
other potential differences that explain why immigrants choose to apply or not. Plenty of evidence
suggests that those who choose to apply typically have resided in the country for a longer period
of time (in part simply due to residency requirements), they are better informed, better integrated,
perhaps more educated or more fluent in the local language (see, for example, Chiswick and Miller
(2009)). Immigrants who apply might also identify more strongly with the host country and its culture
or have differences in other traits like their intention to stay or political interest that lead them to seek
citizenship compared to the group of immigrants who do not (see, for example, Yang (1994)). The
comparison of non-naturalized and naturalized immigrants is therefore one of apples and oranges.
In the second stage, decision makers then review the applications and often interview the applicants
to decide who gets citizenship and who is denied. The problem here is that decision makers typically
have much more information about the applicants than is observed by the researcher and they would
typically use this information to decide on the applicants. For example, applicants who fail to make
a “good impression” in the application interview (in terms of appearance, lacking language skills,
familiarity with the host country, etc.) might be more likely to be rejected because they are perceived
to have a low potential to integrate. As a result of this screening, the comparison between accepted and
rejected applicants is again like comparing apples and oranges because the reasons that determine why
an applicant is rejected might be correlated with the integration outcomes of interest. For example,
those who are judged to have a lower integration potential might be less likely to integrate successfully.
Overcoming this double selection bias with typical observational data is a fairly hopeless endeavor. We
cannot measure the myriad unobserved confounders that determine immigrants’ selection into applying
as well as all the unobserved confounders that determine the decision makers’ selection among the
applicants. In fact, we typically have little information about whether and why immigrants applied
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Figure 1: Double Selection Bias
Naturalized immigrantsNon-naturalized immigrants
Application
Rejected Accepted
No
Application
Note: Illustration of the double selection bias that confounds the comparison of naturalized and non-naturalized immigrants.
and also much less information about the applicants than the decision makers when they make their
screening decisions. But unless we can control for all the confounding characteristics that determine
the selection in both stages we will end up with biased estimates of the effect of citizenship since the
unmeasured confounding characteristics are correlated with the outcomes and the application decision.
Note that a similar selection bias applies when trying to estimate the effect of the timing of the
naturalization. The timing of when immigrants naturalize is again far from randomly assigned and
there are many potential differences that explain why some immigrants choose to apply early and
others chose to apply only later into their residency period. For example, more motivated or better
informed immigrants might apply right after they become eligible, while less motivated or informed
ones delay their naturalization until they have been in the host country for a long time.
III. Empirical Strategy
In order to eliminate the double selection bias and isolate the causal effect of citizenship from the effect
of pre-existing differences in background characteristics, the ideal design would involve an experiment
where we randomly assign citizenship among a group of eligible immigrants. Random assignment forms
the gold standard for causal attribution, because it ensures that the treatment group of immigrants
who obtain citizenship is similar to the control group of immigrants who do not obtain citizenship on
all measured and unmeasured characteristics. Our research design exploits a natural experiment in
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Switzerland that closely mimics this ideal experiment.
A. The Swiss Naturalization Regime in Comparative Perspective
Naturalization has been a divisive issue in Switzerland for many decades given its unusually large
immigrant population. To compare the Swiss naturalization regime with that of other European and
North American Countries, Figure 2 plots the Citizenship Policy Index (CPI) for various countries for
the year 2005.6 The CPI is a standard measure developed by Howard (2005) that uses an additive
formula to measure a country’s citizenship policy between very liberal (6) and highly restrictive (0).
It is based on the three main components of citizenship policy: whether citizenship is granted by place
of birth or by citizenship of the parents, the length of the residency requirement for naturalization,
and the acceptance of dual citizenship for immigrants (see Howard (2005) and the SI appendix for
details).
Figure 2: Citizenship Policy Index for European and North American Countries
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Note: The Citizenship Policy Index (CPI) measures a country’s citizenship policy between very liberal (6) and highly restrictive (0) based
on citizenship by birth, residency requirements, and acceptance of dual citizenship.
6Note that the CPI scores refer to 2005 which roughly corresponds to the timing of many of the naturalization
decisions in our sample from the late 1990s and early 2000s. Some citizenship policies have since changed (see, for
example, Goodman (2010)).
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The plot reveals that the Swiss citizenship regime is similar to the sample median on the CPI, on
par with other restrictive countries like Germany or Italy that also use the jus sanguinis principle (i.e.
citizenship is passed on from the parents’ citizenship). While Switzerland does require a fairly long
residency period, its regime is more liberal insofar as it allows dual citizenship in contrast to many of
the restrictive countries.7
B. Naturalization Referendums
Naturalization applications in Switzerland are decided at the municipal level. An immigrant who has
cleared the eligibility requirements and seeks naturalization is required to apply with the municipality
in which he or she resides. The municipal authorities then process and green light the application until
it is eventually put to a vote (see Hainmueller and Hangartner (Forthcoming) for an overview). We
focus on the group of so called ballot box municipalities who until 2003 used secret ballot referendums
to decide on the applications.89 A naturalization referendum typically had two phases. In the first
phase, a voting leaflet was mailed to all Swiss voters in the municipality that informed the voters
about the pending naturalization requests with a short re´sume´ that described each applicant. The
re´sume´s typically included information about the applicant’s origin, gender, martial status, number of
kids, year of arrival, education, occupation, and an assessment of their language skills and integration
levels as assessed in the application interview. An example leaflet is provided in Figure A.1 in the SI.
In the second phase, voters then cast a secret ballot where they voted ‘yes’ or ‘no’ on each applicant
and Swiss citizenship was awarded only to applicants who received a majority of positive votes. Note
that voting on referendums occurred in regular intervals and naturalization referendums appeared
on the ballot alongside other questions about municipal matters that are all typically decided via
referendums in Switzerland, such as decisions about the local budget, infrastructure, urban planning,
etc.. The use of naturalization referendums ended in 2003 when the Swiss federal court ruled that
7Switzerland requires 12 years of residence (years between ages 10 and 20 count double) (Bu¨rgerrechtsgesetz §15).
Notice that we focus on so called “ordinary” naturalizations which cover the large majority of naturalizations in Switzer-
land.
8Note that the first naturalization decisions in our sample were all made at the municipality level. The cantons were
not involved in the decision.
9Hainmueller and Hangartner (2013) show that ballot box municipalities are very similar to other municipalities in
Switzerland and that residential choice of immigrants is mainly driven by where immigrants found their first job, not
concerns about citizenship. In addition, switching municipalities to get citizenship is not straightforward because of
local residency requirements for naturalization.
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secret ballot referendums can no longer be used for naturalization decisions (see Hainmueller and
Hangartner (Forthcoming) for details).
C. Identifying the Effect of Naturalization
The naturalization referendums allow us to devise two identification strategies that overcome the
thorny double selection bias and get at the long term effects of naturalization. The identification
strategies guard against selection bias in two ways. First, we can remove the selection into applying
by limiting the analysis to only those motivated immigrants who applied and cleared the eligibility
criteria such that they faced a naturalization referendum. Second, we can remove the second stage
selection into who is accepted or rejected for naturalization using two strategies that exploit the use
of voting leaflets and the occurrence of close referendums, respectively.
C.1. Instrumental Variable Strategy
In the first strategy we utilize the fact that we can measure and control for all the applicant character-
istics that were reported to voters in the voting leaflets when they voted on the applicants and therefore
rule out omitted variable bias. In contrast to the situation where an immigration official decides on
the applicants based on information that is unobserved to the researcher, here we do observe all the
relevant applicant characteristics that were reported to voters who decided on each request. Once we
adjust for the reported characteristics and compare applicants who applied in the same municipality,
in the same time period, have the same gender, country of origin, marital status, number of kids,
education, occupational skill, years of residency, assessed integration level and language proficiency,
such matched applicants are observably equivalent to voters and therefore voters cannot systematic-
ally discriminate between applicants based on their unobserved characteristics. Therefore among such
observably equivalent applicants who are matched on the characteristics that voters see on the leaflets,
who wins and who loses is not driven by systematic differences in the integration potential of the indi-
vidual immigrants, but by idiosyncratic shocks that affect the aggregate vote outcomes such as what
else appeared on the ballot or the weather on the day of the referendum. Hainmueller and Hangartner
(2013) provide substantial evidence for this selection on observables assumption. For example, they
show that the effect of the reported applicant characteristics on the vote outcomes are similar in large
and small municipalities which rules out the possibility that private information about the applicants
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might have a systematic effect on the outcomes of the referendums.
One remaining issue that we have to address with this strategy is the issue of non-compliance
by which we mean the fact that a sizable proportion of applicants who lost their first naturalization
referendum re-applied and subsequently obtained citizenship. Fortunately, we can directly address the
issue of re-applications by exploiting the exogenous variation in naturalization status that results from
winning or losing the first referendum that each applicant faces. For this we apply the instrumental
variable (IV) framework with heterogeneous treatment effects as developed in Angrist, Imbens and
Rubin (1996) which allows us to treat the outcome of the first referendum like a randomized encour-
agement design experiment where those applicants who win their first referendum are encouraged to
get citizenship, while those who do not win their first referendum are encouraged not to get citizenship.
Employing the framework of Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996) the population of applicants is
made up of two subgroups. The subgroup of so-called compliers are the applicants who comply with
the encouragement. In other words, they get naturalized if they win their first referendum but do not
get naturalized if they lose their first referendum. The other subgroup are the so-called always-takers.
These are the applicants who always get naturalized, even if they lose their first referendum they
re-apply and subsequently get citizenship.10
To identify the local average treatment effect of naturalization (LATE) for the subgroup of compliers
we compute the intention-to-treat effect (ITT), which is the effect of wining the first referendum on
social integration, and divide it by the proportion of compliers in our sample, which is given by the
first stage effect of winning the first referendum on the probability of naturalization or equivalently
the difference between the proportion of winning applicants who do get Swiss citizenship and the
proportion of losing applicants who nonetheless get citizenship through a re-application. Following
the convention in the literature we also refer to the proportion of compliers as the compliance ratio.
To estimate the LATE, we code a binary treatment indicator that captures whether the immigrant
is naturalized or not and a binary instrument that captures whether the immigrant won or lost his or
her first referendum. We then run a two-stage least squares model regressing the integration outcome
on the reported applicant characteristics from the leaflets, municipality and time period fixed effects,
10Note that in our context the non-compliance is purely one-sided since applicants who succeed in their first referendum
always get citizenship. Therefore there are no so called defiers (applicants who get citizenship if they lose and do not
get citizenship if they win) and also no never-takers (applicants who never get citizenship, even if they win).
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and the treatment variable which we instrument with the instrumental variable (Angrist, Imbens and
Rubin 1996). Importantly, this strategy relies on the fact that we have enough compliers in our sample
and therefore the first stage effect is sufficiently strong. Below we test this assumption and find that
the instrument is indeed sufficiently strong.
C.2. Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design Strategy
We also apply a second, complimentary, empirical strategy based on a fuzzy regression discontinuity
(RD) design which similarly removes the second stage selection into who is approved for naturalization.
The fuzzy RD design exploits the exogenous variation that is generated among the subset of applicants
who barely won or lost their first naturalization referendum by just a few votes. In narrowly decided
referendums, the outcome of the referendum is largely decided by random factors, such as the weather
on election day or other agenda items that appeared on the ballot, rather than the characteristics
of the applicants. In other words, who loses and who wins is as good as randomly assigned and we
can therefore isolate the causal effect of citizenship on the downstream integration outcomes just like
in a randomized experiment. The required identification assumption in the RD design is that the
potential integration outcomes of the immigrants are continuous at the threshold (Hahn, Todd and
Van der Klaauw 2001). This assumption could fail if immigrants could sort around the threshold
such that barely rejected and barely accepted applicants would differ systematically. However, sorting
around the threshold would require that individual immigrants have precise control over the aggregate
referendum outcome which is not plausible in our secret ballot referendums which are large elections.11
Figure 3 illustrates the logic of the fuzzy RD design. The top left panel plots a balance test where
the vertical axis is the applicants’ vote share margin from the first naturalization referendum and
the horizontal axis is the applicants’ years of education—as reported on the voting leaflet. The vote
margin is computed as the difference between the applicants’ share of ‘yes’ votes and the threshold
of 50% of ‘yes’ votes that the applicant had to exceed to win the referendum and thereby receive
Swiss citizenship. The plot is focused on the sample of ‘competitive’ applicants who are within a
±15% window around the threshold of winning. The red and blue line summarize the average years
of education on both sides of the threshold, respectively. We see that in close referendums, which
are decided by just a few votes, who loses and who wins is as good as random and therefore the
11Eggers et al. (2015) show support for the no sorting assumption in a wide variety of elections.
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education level of close winners and close losers are similar on average at the threshold. Given this
local random assignment, we expect close winners and close losers to be similar on all other observed
and unobserved confounders, just like in an randomized experiment and this covariate balance allows
us to remove the selection bias. Figure B.2 in the SI shows that close winners and close losers are
similarly balanced on other background characteristics; the distribution of p-values from the balance
tests closely approximates the uniform distribution as expected given randomization at the threshold.12
Figure 3: Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design: Identification Checks and the Effect of Naturaliza-
tion on Long-Term Social Integration
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Upper left panel indicates that years of education (a pre-treatment covariate) is balanced at the victory threshold in the
naturalization referendums. Lower right panel shows that the density is smooth across the victory threshold suggesting
that there is no evidence of sorting. Lower left and right panels show that long-term social integration and the probability
of naturalization sharply increase when comparing applicants who barley won and barley lost their first naturalization
referendum. (Loess lines; 95% confidence intervals for binned averages).
12Note that the year of the referendum is also well balanced at the threshold which rules out the possibility that the
results are driven by confounding that stems from differences in the timing of initial naturalization decision (such as
changes in the broader political mood).
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The top right panel shows another important identification check for the fuzzy RD design where
we follow McCrary (2008) and explicitly test for the no sorting assumption by computing the density
of the vote margin variable. If applicants had precise control to manipulate their voting results we
should see an unusually large (small) number of applicants who barely win (loose). In other words, we
would expect a jump in the density of the vote margin variable as we cross the threshold. Instead, we
see that the density is smooth across the threshold which implies that there is no evidence for sorting
of applicants around the threshold. This is what we expect given that it is implausible for applicants
to precisely control the outcome of referendums that involve thousands of voters.
The plot in the bottom left panel previews the main result for the ITT effect. The lines summarize
the applicants’ average score on the social integration scale, the summary measure of social integration
measured in our recently administered follow-up survey, as a function of the vote share margin. We
see that levels of social integration jump considerably at the threshold such that applicants who barely
won their first referendum and received Swiss citizenship are today much better integrated on average
compared to otherwise similar applicants who barely lost their first referendum. Given the local
random assignment at the threshold we can attribute this effect to winning the referendum as opposed
to differences on omitted variables.
Note that this ITT effect, which amounts to about a .14 increase on the social integration scale,
understates the effect of naturalization for compliers because many applicants who lost their first refer-
endum eventually naturalized by way of re-applications and therefore also received the treatment. To
correct for this non-compliance and identify the LATE of naturalization for compliers at the threshold
we need to scale the intention-to-treat effect by the compliance ratio at the threshold (Hahn, Todd
and Van der Klaauw 2001).
The bottom right panel visualizes the first stage effect. The lines show the share of naturalized
applicants as a function of the vote margin. The probability of naturalization increases sharply by
about .28 at the threshold and therefore the LATE of naturalization for compliers amounts to about
.14/.28=.5. Note that the social integration scale has a standard deviation of .5 so the LATE estimate
implies that naturalization considerably increased the long-term social integration of immigrants by
about a full standard deviation unit. In the results section below we formally estimate the fuzzy
RDD effect at the threshold by fitting a similar two-stage least model which regresses the integration
outcome on the treatment indicator and instrument this indicator with a binary instrumental variable
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that captures whether applicants succeed in their first referendum or not. To this regression we also
add the vote margin and the interaction of the vote margin with the instrumental variable such that
the LATE of naturalization is identified for compliers only right at the threshold of winning.
Note that the two empirical strategies are complementary to each other in that they identify the
same naturalization effect based on slightly different assumptions. However, there is an important
difference in the external validity between the two designs since they identify this effect for different
subgroups of applicants. The IV design offers higher external validity because it identifies the LATE
of naturalization for the subgroup of compliers in general, while the fuzzy RD design is limited in its
external validity as it only identifies the LATE of naturalization for the subgroup of compliers who
are right at the threshold of winning. Because of this local identification we also lose precision in the
fuzzy RD design and have less power to detect potential naturalization effects.
IV. Data
A. Sample and Covariates
We draw on a variety of original data to implement our empirical strategies. The basis for our sample
is the data compiled by Hainmueller and Hangartner (2013) based on the voting leaflets and voting
outcomes for all 2,225 applicants who faced naturalization referendums between 1970 and 2003 in all
the 46 ballot box municipalities who used secret ballot referendums with voting leaflets (see SI for
details).
Our covariates capture the applicants characteristics reported on the leaflets. They include the ap-
plicant’s gender, age, number of kids, country of origin, marital status, highest educational attainment,
occupational skill, years of residency prior to the application (including an indicator for immigrants
born in Switzerland), language proficiency, and integration status. The SI describes the coding of all
variables used in our analysis and provides the descriptive statistics (Tables B.2 and B.3).
To measure the social integration outcomes we administered a survey of all immigrants who faced
naturalization referendums. We first extracted the addresses of these immigrants at the time of
their naturalization referendum and then tracked down the applicants to the best of our abilities and
administered a survey by phone. As expected, several of the addresses were outdated as immigrants
had moved, died, or left the country. Nonetheless, we interviewed 768 applicants which amounts to a
cumulative response rate 3 (RR3) as defined by the American Association for Public Opinion Research
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of 34.5%. Among competitive applicants who are within a ± 15 vote margin of winning the response
rate was even higher and we interviewed 474 applicants for an RR3 of 45.9%. This is a higher response
rate than is typically achieved by phone surveys in Switzerland or the United States, let alone for
surveys of immigrants (see SI for details).
One potential concern might be that the probability of being interviewed is correlated with nat-
uralization and integration. In the SI we provide evidence that this is not a concern in our study.
In particular, we find that the probability of being interviewed as well as the characteristics of those
being interviewed are no different for immigrants who were narrowly accepted and narrowly rejected
for naturalization (see Figure B.1 and Table B.1). Moreover, in our context we would expect that dif-
ferential attrition would, if anything, lead to an attenuation bias in our effect estimates if naturalized
immigrants are more likely to stay in Switzerland than non-naturalized immigrants and among the
non-naturalized those with lower levels of integration are more likely to leave than those with higher
levels of integration.
B. Outcome Measures
Immigrant social integration is a latent and multifaceted concept that involves several dimensions
such as social inclusion, social engagement, intergroup contact, social capital, and discrimination
(Berry 1997; Castles et al. 2002; Carens 2005; OECD 2012). Studies have used different measures
to capture these various dimensions of social integration and there is no single commonly agreed
upon measure that is consistently applied in the literature. Given this our study takes a pragmatic
approach to measurement and combines four existing measures in a social integration scale to obtain
a comprehensive and reliable summary measure of social integration. The use of a scale ensures that
the results are not driven by a single survey question that might only tap into one dimension of social
integration. Averaging across multiple measures also addresses the well-known problem of potentially
serious attenuation bias due to random measurement error that typically arises in survey research when
trying to measure a latent concept with single survey questions (see, for example, Achen (1975)).13
13Averaging across multiple items offers an effective remedy to decrease random measurement error, typically at a
rate of approximately 1/L where L is the number of questions (see, for example, Ansolabehere, Rodden and Snyder
(2008)). We acknowledge that building a scale of existing measures does not provide a silver bullet for solving the general
problem of measuring social integration, but it does strike a balance between capturing some of the most important
dimensions of the concept as used in prior work while recognizing the limits of what can be accomplished in a single
survey. We acknowledge that we do not capture other important dimensions of immigrant integration such as cultural
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Our scale is generated from four survey questions that have been used in prior work and tap into
various various dimensions of social integration. The first item, Plans to stay in Switzerland, is a
question that measures whether immigrants are planning to stay in Switzerland for good or whether
they have plans to leave Switzerland. It is coded with values one, zero, and minus one, for immigrants
who have plans to stay forever, those who are not sure, and those who say they plan to eventually
leave Switzerland, respectively (the SI provides all the question wordings). This item captures whether
naturalization has changed the long term attachment and settlement plans of immigrants and thereby
increased their incentive to invest into a future in Switzerland and reduced the uncertainty associated
with potential return migration (Dustmann 1996). This measure is of theoretical importance because
it directly taps into the theoretical mechanisms through which naturalization might increase social
integration by shifting the time horizons of immigrants towards a long term future in the host country.
It is important to emphasize that the immigrants in our sample who did not naturalize still have
fulfilled the long residency requirements that make them eligible for naturalization and they all hold
a permanent residency permit which allows them to stay in Switzerland for as long as they wish.
This comparison group therefore provides a rather high bar for finding an effect of naturalization on
changing long-term settlement plans. Permanent residents who have been in Switzerland for a long
time can be expected to already have a fairly long time horizon and a high likelihood of wanting to stay
in Switzerland for good. It is therefore far from obvious whether naturalization would have enough of
an effect to shift time horizons even further towards permanently settling in Switzerland.
The second item, Discrimination, is a standard measure of perceived discrimination that is coded as
one for immigrants who describe themselves as being a member of a group that is discriminated against
in Switzerland, and zero if not (Kesler and Demireva 2011). Discrimination is an important barrier
to social integration and a potent source of marginalization and strained intergroup relations between
immigrants and host country nationals. As Kesler and Demireva (2011, pg. 215) put it “perceptions
of discrimination are therefore likely to be important in generating a sense of social cohesion among
immigrants.” This measure also directly taps into the psychological mechanisms discussed above where
naturalization might act as a signal of acceptance and increases a sense of belonging among immigrants
integration, language use, political and economic integration (see Hainmueller, Hangartner and Pietrantuono (2015) for
the effects of naturalization on political integration). In a follow up project we plan to investigate the economic effects
of naturalization by merging the immigrants in our sample to administrative records on income and employment.
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and the recognition of naturalized-immigrants as equals by natives.14
The third item, Club membership, is a measure of social capital that captures whether immigrants
are currently an active member of a social club or association in which they participate in regular
meetings. The answer options included several potential organizations such as a youth organization,
social club, volunteer firefighters, carnival club, political association, a local charter of a charitable
organization, or ‘other’ and we code the measure as one for immigrants who participate in at least
one of these organizations and zero otherwise.15 These clubs form an essential part of the social life in
Swiss communities, and are a standard measure of social integration in official statistics in Switzerland
and many other European countries (Kesler and Demireva 2011; Avitabile, Clots-Figueras and Masella
2013; Kristensen 2014). This item therefore directly taps into whether naturalization increased the
social capital and community engagement of immigrants and thereby their exposure to and interaction
with natives which is another relevant dimension of social integration.
The fourth item, Swiss newspaper, is a question that measures whether immigrants read newspapers
from Switzerland or foreign newspapers from their home country. The answers are coded on a five
point scale ranging from 5 for immigrants who read exclusively Swiss newspapers to 1 for immigrants
who exclusively read newspapers from their home country. This item also taps into the theoretical
mechanisms and captures whether naturalization has indeed shifted the orientation of immigrants
towards Switzerland and away from their homelands in the sense that immigrants feel the need to
acquire information and knowledge about the host country environment as opposed to their country
of origin (Dustmann 1996; Avitabile, Clots-Figueras and Masella 2013).16
To construct the social integration scale from these four items we extract the first principal com-
ponent from a polychoric principal component analysis (PCA) which has the advantage that it takes
into account the binary and categorial distribution of the items (see SI for details). To aid the inter-
pretability we rescale the first principal component, which explains about 45% of the total variance,
14Note that the measure might pick up perceptions of individual discrimination as well as perceptions of discrimination
at the group level.
15While this item does not allow us to perfectly distinguish between “bridging” (ties to other immigrants) and
“bonding” (ties to natives) social capital Putnam (2007), we did not count membership in sports clubs (which are often
highly segregated) or associations where a particular ethnicity or nationality is a prerequisite (e.g. the Filipino Women’s
Club). Hence, this variable should primarily measure “bonding” social capital. As pointed out by a reviewer, to the
degree that it also captures immigrants interacting with other immigrants, this will lead to an underestimate of the true
effect of naturalization on social integration.
16To the extent that immigrants read Swiss newspapers to acquire information about Swiss politics it might also
capture increased political integration of immigrants.
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to have a mean zero and standard deviation of .5. Note that the results of all models are virtually
identical if we use a simple equal weighted average of the four items instead.
It is important to emphasize that in contrast to other studies of naturalization our outcomes capture
the long-term effects of naturalization. Given that the use of naturalization referendums ended in 2003,
at the time of our survey, the average naturalized immigrant has possessed Swiss citizenship for about
15 years. Our design therefore enables us to examine whether naturalization had any lasting effects
in promoting the long term social integration of immigrants, rather then resulting in only temporary
short term changes.
V. Results
For the effect estimations we focus on the sample of competitive applicants whose vote share margin
is within a ± 15% window around the victory threshold. Figures B.3 and B.4 in the SI show that the
estimated naturalization effects are fairly insensitive to varying the width of the estimation window.
A. First Stage
To check if the instrument is strong enough to create sufficient variation in naturalizations we run
the first stage regression on the estimation sample and regress the naturalization indicator on the
instrument that measures whether applicants narrowly won or lost their first referendum. To mimic
the IV design and the fuzzy RD design we either add the full set of reported applicant characteristics
and time period and municipality fixed effects or the margin of victory and its interaction with the
instrument, respectively. We find that winning the first referendum did indeed strongly increase the
probability of naturalization between .28-.42 depending on the model and this first stage effect is
significant at conventional levels (Table B.4 in the SI). In fact, the Stock and Yogo (2005) F-test
against the null that the instrument had no effect on the treatment is about 94 for the IV model
and 21 for the fuzzy RD model and therefore much higher than the critical threshold of 10 that we
need to exceed in order to avoid the problems associated with a weak instrument. For robustness we
also estimate the fuzzy RD design adding all applicant characteristics and the results are virtually
identical to the fuzzy RD results without adding the extra covariates as expected, given the local
random assignment at the threshold.
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B. Main Effects of Naturalization
Figure 4 shows the effect estimates with cluster robust 90% and 95% confidence intervals for both
identification strategies. The red estimates marked with filled circles refer to the IV model which
control for all the applicant characteristics reported on the leaflets (including gender, age, number
of kids, country of origin, marital status, highest educational attainment, occupational skill, years of
residency prior to the application, language proficiency, and integration status) as well as a full set of
time period and municipality fixed effects to focus the identification on applicants who are matched on
all characteristics and applied in the same municipality and time period (Table B.5 in the SI reports
the regression table). The blue estimates marked with filled triangles refer to the fuzzy RD model
where we adjust for the vote margin and its interaction with the treatment to identify the effect at
the threshold only (Table B.6 in the SI reports the regression table).
Our main finding is that naturalization considerably improved the long-term social integration
of immigrants. Looking at the social integration scale that combines all the integration outcomes
in a single measure, we find that among otherwise identical immigrants, naturalization increases the
social integration scale by about .51—about a full standard deviation unit—according to the IV model
(p<0.0001). The effect is also similar when we look at the fuzzy RD strategy that focuses only on
compliers at the threshold. If anything the naturalization effect is slightly bigger at .74, although the
estimate is also less precise (p<0.033) as we would expect given that fuzzy RD identifies the effect
only at the victory threshold.
Apart from the main naturalization effect on the social integration scale, we also see that the effects
are fairly consistent across the single items that make up the scale despite the fact that the single items
are presumably downward biased due to attenuation bias from measurement error. Looking at the
IV estimates we find that naturalization makes applicants much more likely to have plans to stay
in Switzerland forever, a .49 increase on the three point scale (p<0.003). This change in settlement
plans amounts to about an 80 percent increase over the sample average of this variable. Similarly,
we find that naturalization causes a 28 percentage point decrease (p<0.016) in the likelihood that
applicants report being the victims of discrimination which corresponds to a 140 percent decrease over
the sample average. We also find that naturalization strongly shifts newspaper readership towards
Swiss newspapers, as compared to home country newspapers, with an increase of about .51 on the five
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point scale (p<0.023). This corresponds to a about a 13 percent increase over the sample average. We
also see that naturalization increases the probability that applicants are members of a social club by
about 12 percentage points but the estimates are not significant at conventional levels and not robust
across specifications (p<.23). Overall the fuzzy RD results for the single items are similar to the IV
estimates although less precise as expected.
As a robustness check we also replicated the fuzzy RD strategy while adding the full set covari-
ates and the full set of municipality and period fixed effects to control for any common shocks and
unobserved factors that vary at the level of the municipalities (Table B.7 in the SI). The estimates
are similar to the fuzzy RD design without the covariates with naturalization improving long term
social integration by about .63 (p<0.045) on the social integration scale. This check strongly corrob-
orates the identification strategy and suggests that the covariates are controlled for by design—just
like in a randomized experiment—given that the local random assignment of citizenship in close ref-
erendums resulted in two groups of applicants, those who barely won and those who barely lost, that
are otherwise similar on all observed covariates.
In stark contrast to the view that naturalization is merely the crown on a completed integration
process, these results overall suggest that naturalization in fact has a substantial and lasting causal
impact on improving the long-term social integration of immigrants. The estimates are similar in
both identification strategies. Two immigrants who are just separated by a few ’yes’ votes in their
naturalization referendum, but otherwise identical in terms of their pre-referendum characteristics
(including motivation, resources, origin, residency, language skills, integration status, age, gender,
marital status, education, occupation, etc.) develop remarkably different integration outcomes such
that more than a decade and a half later, those who barely won and received Swiss citizenship are much
better integrated into the social fabric of the Swiss society than those who barely lost and therefore
did not get Swiss citizenship. This boost in integration outcomes is especially striking given that the
applicants had spent a long time in Switzerland already prior to their application. Overall these results
are consistent with Hainmueller, Hangartner and Pietrantuono (2015) who find similarly strong effects
of naturalization on the political integration of immigrants.
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Figure 4: Estimates of Effect of Naturalization on Long-Term Social Integration
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Note: Effect estimates with robust 95% (thin) and 90% (bold) confidence intervals based on the instrumental variable design and the fuzzy
RD design. Standard errors are clustered by the municipality. See text for details.
C. Alienation versus Integration
What mechanisms might drive this positive effect of naturalization on integration? Several of the
mechanisms outlined in the theoretical discussion are likely at play and conclusively distinguishing
between all the specific mechanisms is nearly impossible unless we can obtain (quasi)-randomized vari-
ation for each of the mechanisms. That said, it is worth trying to distinguish between two broad classes
of mechanisms that would lead us to interpret the effects differently. The first class of mechanisms is
based on the idea that the returns to integration are driven by the acquisition of citizenship. In other
words, citizenship provides naturalized immigrants with the recognition, incentives, and resources to
increase their long-term social integration. The second class of mechanisms is based on an alienation
story where the effects of naturalization are driven by those immigrants whose naturalization applic-
ations are denied. In other words, it might be that applicants who are denied became more alienated
from Swiss society than they would have become had they never applied for naturalization in the first
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place. Distinguishing between these two mechanisms is not trivial given that both mechanisms are
two sides of the same coin, i.e. they are possible effects of the same causal treatment which is the
ultimate naturalization decision. Conditional on applying, naturalization decisions always imply that
the application is either denied or accepted.
From a theoretical standpoint one might argue that it is implausible to expect that an alienation
effect, even if it exists for some applicants, would be powerful enough to explain both the large
magnitude and long-term nature of the naturalization effects that we find. In stark contrast to the
accepted applicants who do experience a change in their legal status and acquire the citizenship of
the host country, being denied does not change anything about the applicants’ legal status compared
to a situation where they never had applied in the first place. Unsuccessful applicants retain their
permanent residency permit and can still remain in Switzerland for as long as they wish. And even
though denied applicants presumably are initially annoyed at or disappointed about the outcome of
the referendum, it seems unlikely that this would impact their long-term social integration more than
a decade and a half later which is what our integration measure is capturing.
From an empirical standpoint, one way we can distinguish which of the two broad mechanisms
can best account for our findings is to consider alternative outcomes which are especially sensitive
to one specific mechanism. In particular, if applicants become alienated because their applications
have been denied, then we could expect that they would develop a much higher level of distrust of
the local authorities who handled the applications and did not avert the potentially discriminatory
rejections. We also expect that they would develop a higher level of distrust of the judicial system
more broadly because the courts did not overturn a discriminatory rejection upon appeal. Finally,
we expect them to grow more distrustful of other people in their community given that a majority of
voters voted against their application. In order to test for this alienation mechanism we replicated the
models using measures of distrust of the local authorities, distrust of the judicial system, and distrust
of other people, accordingly (see the SI for the question wording).
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Figure 5: Estimates of Effect of Naturalization on Long-Term Distrust
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Note: Effect estimates with robust 95% (thin) and 90% (bold) confidence intervals based on the instrumental variable design and the fuzzy
RD design. See text for details.
The results, shown in Figure 5, suggest that naturalization had no effect on raising levels of distrust
for all three measures. The point estimates are close to zero and precisely estimated.17 The fact that
accepted and denied applicants show identical levels of distrust long after the application decision
suggests that the long-term naturalization effects are mainly driven by accepted immigrants becoming
more socially integrated once they get citizenship, rather than through an alienation effect where
denied applicants become less socially integrated than they would have had they never applied for
naturalization. Note that this interpretation is also consistent with the other finding presented below
which shows that the effects of naturalization on integration are larger if immigrants naturalize earlier
rather than later into their residency period. In other words, even only comparing among those who do
eventually get citizenship and therefore should not be affected by a potential rejection effect, a higher
“dose” of the treatment of Swiss citizenship does enhance social integration through the cumulative
effects of holding Swiss citizenship.
17In the appendix we show that the results are very similar when we replicate this test for the subsamples of the more
marginalized immigrant groups who are born abroad and who are from Turkey and the former Yugoslavia.
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D. Naturalization Effects by Immigrant Group
As explained above, one important question for policy design and theory is how the effects of nat-
uralization on integration might differ across different types of immigrants, in particular groups of
immigrants who are more or less marginalized to begin with. To investigate this question we now
replicate the analysis and estimate the naturalization effects while splitting the sample in two ways.
First, we consider how the effects of naturalization vary by the immigrants’ origin, distinguish-
ing between applicants from Turkey and the former Yugoslavia with those from other origins. The
other origins mostly include applicants from western, northern, and southern European countries like
Germany, Austria, and Italy. These two groups differ strongly on their levels of marginalization. In
particular, immigrants from the former Yugoslavia and Turkey typically face the most severe discrim-
ination and native backlash in Switzerland (Hainmueller and Hangartner 2013).
Second, we examine how the effects of naturalization vary for immigrants who are born in Switzer-
land and those who are born abroad. Recall that Switzerland does not award citizenship based on
birthright and therefore second-generation immigrants who are born in Switzerland to foreign parents
do not get Swiss citizenship unless they apply through the regular naturalization procedure and suc-
ceed. However, since these immigrants are born and raised in Switzerland they are typically much
better integrated and less marginalized on average compared to immigrants who are born abroad and
arrive in Switzerland later in life (Hainmueller and Hangartner 2013).
The results for these subgroup analyses are shown in Figure 6.18 Strikingly, we find that across
both comparisons, the positive effects of naturalization on long-term social integration are concentrated
among the marginalized origin groups. For example, naturalization increases the social integration scale
by about .52 (p<.001) for immigrants from Turkey and the former Yugoslavia, while the effect is .06
(p<.723) for immigrants from the other origins; the difference between the two effects is statistically
significant (p<.053). Similarly, the naturalization effect on the social integration scale is about .59
(p<.001)) for immigrants who are born abroad while the effect is merely .09 (p<.611) for immigrants
born in Switzerland and the difference between the effects is again statistically significant (p<.045).
18Note that there is almost no correlation between the two subgroups. For example, the fraction of applicants who
are born in Switzerland is 18 percent among applicants from Turkey and the former Yugoslavia and 21 percent among
those not from from Turkey and the former Yugoslavia.
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Figure 6: Effects of Naturalization on Long Term Social Integration by Origin Group
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Note: Effect estimates with robust 95% (thin) and 90% (bold) confidence intervals based on the instrumental variable design.
Taken together, these results suggest that the long-term social integration returns to naturaliza-
tion are much bigger for the more marginalized groups of immigrants from Turkey and the former
Yugoslavia and immigrants who are not born in Switzerland. From a policy standpoint, these results
starkly contrast with the view that naturalization should be restricted to only the most well integ-
rated immigrants since only they are well equipped to take advantage of citizenship. Quite to the
contrary, we find that for these groups the effects of naturalization on integration are, if anything,
much more modest. From a theoretical standpoint, the results beg the question of what might explain
this heterogeneity in the effects of naturalization. Why are the integration returns to naturalization
larger for more marginalized immigrant groups? As we discussed in the theory section above, one
possibility is that naturalization enables more marginalized immigrants to overcome their resource
constraints and invest in integration, but for less marginalized immigrants naturalization might be less
critical given that such immigrants face fewer resource constraints and are better able to invest into
integration even in the absence of naturalization. Another possibility is that naturalization affects
31
integration by mitigating discrimination from natives. In this logic, we see larger integration returns
among more marginalized immigrants because they typically face the strongest discrimination unless
they naturalize. We see lower integration returns among less marginalized immigrants because they
face less discrimination and are more likely to be recognized as equals by natives even in the absence
of naturalization.
It is important to recognize that in our study we do not have sufficient data and sample sizes to
conclusively distinguish between the investment and discrimination channel as well as other mechan-
isms that might account for the effect heterogeneity. But in order to shed some light on this issue we
can examine how the effect of naturalization varies within the marginalized origin groups between im-
migrants who have fewer resources and therefore face more binding constraints on their investments.
To do so we focus on the two marginalized immigrant origin groups from above—immigrants from
Turkey and former Yugoslavia and those not born in Switzerland—and in each group further split the
sample according to whether the immigrants at the time of their naturalization referendum worked in
low or medium and high skilled occupations, respectively.19 If the heterogeneity in the naturalization
effect is driven predominantly by a personal investment mechanism then we would expect that the
integration returns from naturalization are higher for immigrants in low skilled occupations because
they face more resource constraints than immigrants in medium and high skilled occupations who
tend to have more resources in the form of higher educational backgrounds, better language skills, and
other economic advantages despite belonging to the same marginalized origin group. Alternatively,
if the heterogeneity in the naturalization effect is predominantly driven by a discrimination mechan-
ism then we would expect that the integration returns to naturalization are fairly similar across low
and high skilled immigrants since they belong to the same marginalized group and are at the risk of
discrimination by natives.
The results from this test are displayed in Figure 7. We find that the effects of naturalization on
long-term social integration are uniform across skill levels and this holds in both of the marginalized
immigrant groups. The point estimates of the effects for the low and medium/high skilled are similar
19We constructed the skill measure based on the applicants’ occupations that were listed on the re´sume´s in the
voting leaflets. The skill levels refer to the first digit of the ISCO-88 occupational classification code. Managers and
professionals are coded as highly skilled; technicians, associate professionals, clerical support workers, and service and
sales workers are coded as medium skilled; and craft workers, assemblers, elementary occupations are coded as low
skilled (see Hainmueller and Hangartner (2013) for details on the coding). We split on low versus medium and high skill
because that creates roughly equal sample sizes for the subgroups.
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in substantive terms and the differences in the effects are not significant (at p<.84 for immigrants
from Turkey and former Yugoslavia and p<.80 for immigrants who are not born in Switzerland). The
fact that within the marginalized groups immigrants benefit equally from naturalization despite the
differences in their skill levels suggests that—at least in our context—the variation in the effects of
naturalization on integration might be more driven by reducing the discrimination from natives rather
than enabling immigrants to overcome resource constraints. However, it is important to recognize that
this evidence is suggestive at best given that we are dealing with increasingly small sample sizes and
lack high frequency measures that would allow us to directly capture how personal investments respond
to naturalization over time. Moreover, the evidence about the mechanisms might be rather specific
to our case given that most immigrants who have completed the lengthy residency requirements and
apply to naturalize have already reached a fairly high threshold level of integration and this might
therefore leave less room for potential investments than might be observed for immigrants in other
contexts who naturalize at an earlier stage.
Figure 7: Effects of Naturalization on Long Term Social Integration for Marginalized Origin Groups
by Skill Level
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Note: Effect estimates with robust 95% (thin) and 90% (bold) confidence intervals based on a two-stage least squares regression.
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E. Early versus Late Naturalization
As explained above, another important question apart from the effect heterogeneity is whether nat-
uralization is more or less effective when immigrants naturalize earlier or later into their residency
period. Testing for an effect of early versus late naturalization is difficult empirically because the
timing of the naturalization is typically endogenous. The ideal experiment would be to consider a
group of immigrants and to randomly assign the time at which they receive Swiss citizenship such that
the group of immigrants who get it earlier are identical to the group of immigrants who get it later
in terms of all confounding characteristics. This would allow one to isolate the effect of having Swiss
citizenship for a longer period on the subsequent integration.
Fortunately, in our setting we can conduct an empirical strategy that closely approximates this
ideal experiment. We focus on the group of naturalized applicants and exploit the fact that the
outcome of the first referendum provides an exogenous shock to the timing of the naturalization.
Among applicants who are otherwise similar in their characteristics—including the year they arrived in
Switzerland, the year in which they faced their first naturalization referendum, and the total number
of years in Switzerland—those who get lucky and win their first referendum immediately become
Swiss while those who get unlucky and lose their first referendum are denied and have to re-apply to
subsequently get Swiss citizenship years later. We can exploit this exogenous variation by using an IV
design where winning or losing the first referendum is used as an instrument for the number of years
that applicants have possessed Swiss citizenship.20
As a first step, we run the first-stage regression where the (logged) number of years with Swiss
citizenship is regressed on the full set of covariates (applicant characteristics plus municipality and
time period fixed effects) and our instrument that captures whether applicants won or lost their first
referendum. We also add six categorical indicators to flexibly control for the total prior residency
in Switzerland. We find that winning the first referendum strongly increases the number of years
with Swiss citizenship by about 60 percent—roughly nine more years on average—and this effect is
20One potential concern with this identification strategy is that the group of immigrants that was naturalized in the
first referendum consists of both always-takers and compliers, while the group of rejected applicants that was naturalized
in a later attempt consists of only always-takers. We believe that this bias is negligible since we expect the potential
integration outcome to be larger for always-takers than compliers. In the SI we derive and conduct a formal sensitivity
analysis that shows that the outcome for compliers would have to be more than three times larger than for always-takers
in order to render the early versus late naturalization effect on the social integration scale insignificant (and more than
eight times larger to change the sign of the relationship).
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significant with a Stock and Yogo (2005) F-value of about 48 (see Table B.16 in the SI).
Next, we examine how this exogenous increase in the number of years with Swiss citizenship affects
social integration. To do so we fit a two-stage least square model where we regress the integration
outcome on the full set of covariates, the six categorical indicators to flexibly control for the total
prior residency, and the (logged) number of years with Swiss citizenship and this endogenous variable
is instrumented for by winning or losing the first referendum. From the perspective of those who
advocate for early naturalizations we would expect a positive effect of naturalizing early versus late,
while from the perspective of those who advocate for late naturalizations we would expect a negative
effect. Figure 8 shows the estimated effects of naturalizing early versus late as measured by a 20%
Figure 8: Effects of Early versus Late Naturalization on Long Term Social Integration
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Note: Effect estimates with robust 95% (thin) and 90% (bold) confidence intervals based on a two-stage least squares regression.
increase in the years with Swiss citizenship. We find that the integration returns to having Swiss
citizenship earlier, rather than later, are mostly positive. Comparing applicants who are otherwise
identical in their characteristics—including the year or arrival, year of the first application, and the
total number of years in Switzerland—a 20% increase in the number of years being Swiss increases the
social integration scale by about .08 (p<.005), so about a one sixth of a standard deviation unit. This
is a substantively big effect given that a 20% increase is roughly equivalent to only three more years
of Swiss citizenship.
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In the SI we present a variety of additional checks that underscore the robustness of these findings.
In particular we show that the results are not driven by an unwarranted linearity assumption for the
(logged) number of years with Swiss citizenship (see Figure B.5 and Figure B.6). Taken together these
results suggest that naturalization earlier, rather than later, is more effective in terms of increasing
the long term social integration of immigrants and this effect is strong in the sense that even a few
years earlier can make a real difference for social long-term integration.
VI. Conclusion
In this study, we contribute to the ongoing debates about the theories and design of citizenship policies
by providing new causal evidence about the effect of naturalization on the long-term social integration
of immigrants in Switzerland. We exploit the quasi-random assignment to citizenship that occurs
in naturalization referendums to isolate the effect of naturalization from the non-random selection
into naturalization. We find that naturalization strongly improved the long-term social integration
of immigrants. Comparing otherwise identical immigrants who only differ in that they barely won or
lost naturalization referendums a decade and a half ago, we find that those who won and therefore
received Swiss citizenship develop much higher levels of social integration such that today they are
about one standard deviation higher on our summary measure of the social integration scale. These
lasting effects are robust across two identification strategies and across a variety of robustness checks.
Turning to the questions of effect heterogeneity we find that the integration returns to naturaliz-
ation are much larger for more marginalized immigrant groups, such as immigrants from Turkey and
the former Yugoslavia and those who are not born in Switzerland. In fact, the positive effects of nat-
uralization on long-term social integration are concentrated among these most marginalized groups.
Last but not least, we exploit exogenous variation in the timing of the naturalization and find that the
integration returns from naturalization are larger if immigrants naturalize earlier rather than later in
their residency period.
These findings have important implications for theory and policy. The findings run counter to the
paradigm that argues that naturalization is merely a reward for successfully completing the integration
process. Instead, the findings support those who argue that naturalization acts as an important catalyst
for integration by providing immigrants with the recognition, resources, and incentives to integrate
and invest in a future in the host country society. Contrary to those who argue for high hurdles for
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access to naturalization, the findings also demonstrate that the returns to naturalization are much
larger for more marginalized groups and somewhat larger when naturalization occurs earlier, rather
than later in the residency period.
Our estimates only capture the effects of naturalization among immigrants who have applied for
citizenship and therefore speak most directly to the impacts of naturalization given the current policy.
However, the patterns that the catalytic effects of naturalization are stronger for more marginalized
groups and those naturalizing earlier rather than later carry an important implication for policy reform.
In particular, the findings suggest that our results provide a lower bound for the naturalization effects
we might expect if Swiss policy-makers were to marginally lower the stringent criteria to open the door
to naturalization for immigrants who are slightly less integrated or have slightly shorter residency and
therefore might realize even larger catalytic benefits from naturalization. While it remains an open
question what the optimal threshold for naturalizations is, our results suggest that if the goal is to
maximize integration, the current Swiss requirements appear to be too restrictive, especially the long
residency period which acts to strongly reduce the number of years that naturalized immigrants can
enjoy host country citizenship and reap the social integration benefits associated with it.
While our results have high internal validity due to the quasi-random assignment to citizenship,
the generalizability of our results beyond Switzerland is more difficult to assess. One guide to assess
the external validity is to examine how the Swiss citizenship regime compares to the regimes in other
European and North American countries like we did in the section on the empirical setting above.
There we found that the Swiss regime was just about at the sample median in terms of the Citizenship
Policy Index, with many countries having similarly restrictive regime like Germany or Italy and some
even more restrictive regimes like Austria or Denmark. Our results therefore might well generalize to
these other important cases where the citizenship rules are similarly or even more restrictive.
At this point we can only speculate how the results might generalize to other countries with much
more liberal citizenship regimes where the eligible population includes many immigrants who have been
in the country much shorter. On the one hand, one might argue that our results from Switzerland
could provide a lower bound for the effects of naturalization on integration. Since the requirements in
Switzerland are higher, most immigrants who apply to naturalize have already reached a high threshold
level of integration and those who do not naturalize already have access to many of the same rights
and privileges as citizens so that there should be less room for further improvements in integration.
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But despite such a possible ceiling effect, we still find sizable impacts of naturalization. This suggests
that the effects might be more pronounced in more liberal countries where the pre-naturalization levels
of integration are lower on average and therefore there is more room for improvement. Moreover, the
higher residency requirements mean that naturalized immigrants have fewer years as naturalized Swiss
citizens and as our results show, there are large integration returns to getting naturalized earlier rather
than later into the residency period, at least in the Swiss context. This suggests that in more liberal
regimes, where immigrants tend to naturalize earlier and they therefore have more time with the host
country citizenship, the returns to integration could be even larger.
On the other hand, it could be that there exists a critical threshold in terms of restrictiveness of
the citizenship regime below which the naturalization effects become very different. If that is the case,
then the results might be quite different in the countries that have much more liberal regimes than
Switzerland. In the end, we advise against over- or under-generalizing our results from Switzerland to
other contexts. External validity is best examined by replicating the results from multiple internally
valid studies in other countries and other time periods, and so we hope that our study will stimu-
late future research that examines the causal effects of citizenship on economic, political, and social
outcomes. Further research is also clearly needed to better understand how the mechanisms through
which naturalization propels integration might vary across groups, time, and local context.
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Supporting Information Appendices (Not for Publication)
Appendix A: Data Sources
Table 1: Question wording and codebook for outcome variables
Variable Question Values
Integration Scale First principal component of polychoric PCA of
the four outcome variables
standardized with mean = 0 and standard
deviation = .5
Plans to stay in Switzer-
land
Are you planning to stay in Switzerland for good
or do you plan to leave Switzerland at some
point?
1 plan to stay in Switzerland for good
0 don’t know
-1 plan to leave Switzerland
Discrimination Would you describe yourself as being a mem-
ber of a group that is discriminated against in
Switzerland?
1 yes, 0 no
Club membership Are you currently a member of a social club or
association in which you attend meetings regu-
larly?
1 if member in at least one organization, 0 if
member in none (note that membership in
sports clubs and ethnic associations are not
counted).
Swiss newspaper When you read newspapers, do you read 1 exclusively newspapers from your home
country?
2 mainly newspapers from your home coun-
try?
3 both, Swiss newspapers as well as newspa-
pers from your home country?
4 mainly Swiss newspapers?
5 exclusively Swiss newspapers?
Distrust judicial system How much do you trust [the judicial system]? 11-point scale, rescaled to 0 – 1 with higher
values indicating less trust
Distrust local authorities How much do you trust [local authorities]? 11-point scale, rescaled to 0 – 1 with higher
values indicating less trust
Distrust for other people Do you think most people can be trusted or that
you can’t be too careful in deadline with people?
11-point scale, rescaled to 0 – 1 with higher
values indicating less trust
1
Online Appendix
Figure A.1: Sample leaflet sent out to voters (names redacted)
Figure C.2: Sample Leaflet I
Note: Sample voting leaflet (names blacked out).
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Translation for leaflet shown in Figure A.1:
Application of APPLICANT, 1965, Italian citizen, domiciled in Steinen, for naturalization
in the municipality of Steinen.
A. Report
On December 6, 1984, APPLICANT, 1965, Italian citizen, applied for naturalization in
the municipality of Steinen.
The applicant was born on February 25, 1965 in Schwyz as the son of APPLICANT’s
FATHER and APPLICANT’s MOTHER who at the time already lived in Steinen. Since
his birth APPLICANT has been living with his parents in Steinen, Sonnenbergli, and also
2
lived there during his youth. He attended the primary school and secondary school in
Steinen.
After completing school, APPLICANT took up an apprenticeship in business administra-
tion with the Bern Insurance Company in Schwyz. He successfully graduated from the
apprenticeship in early 1984.
Following the completion of his degree he continued to work for Bern Insurance in Bern
where he is currently employed as an accident insurance agent.
Even though he is registered as working in Bern during the week, his permanent legal
residence is still in Steinen with his parents. Following the completion of his on the job
training and the completion of his vocational training school he plans to continue his work
in our area and to continue to live in Steinen.
3
Appendix B: Additional Results
In this appendix we present additional results that are referenced in the main paper.
A. Citizenship Policy Index
The Citizenship Policy Index (CPI) is a standard measure developed by Howard (2005) that uses a
simple additive formula to measure a country’s citizenship policy between very liberal (6) and highly
restrictive (0). It is based on the three main components of citizenship policy: whether citizenship is
granted by place of birth or by the citizenship of the parents, the length of the residency requirement
for naturalization, and the acceptance of dual citizenship for immigrants. To generate the index, each
country is allocated points if citizenship by birth is allowed (2 points) or not allowed (0 points), if
residency requirements for naturalization are five years or less (2 points), between six and nine years (1
point) or ten years or higher (0 points), and if dual citizenship is accepted (2 points) or not accepted
(0 points). We use the CPI for the year of 200521 to code selected European countries, as well as
Australia, Canada, and the United States, to place Switzerland in a comparative perspective.
Figure 2 reveals that there are roughly four groups of countries. The most restrictive countries
have a CPI of zero and include countries like Spain, Austria, or Slovenia. These countries use the jus
sanguinis principle which implies that citizenship is passed on from the citizenship of the parents. They
also require at least 10 years of residency before immigrants become eligible for naturalization and they
do not allow for dual citizenship which means that immigrants who naturalize have to renounce their
home country citizenship. The second group of less restrictive countries cluster around a CPI value
of two and include Switzerland, Germany, Italy, Poland, and or Greece. These countries all use the
jus sanguinis principle, but they are more liberal insofar as they either have shorter residency periods
(between 5 and 8 years) but prohibit dual citizenship, like Germany and Poland, or they have a long
residency period (10 of more years) but allow for dual citizenship, like Switzerland and Italy. The
third group of countries, including Sweden and Finland, is more liberal with a CPI value of around
four. They still maintain the jus sanguinis principle but have shorter residency requirements (typically
5 years) and allow dual citizenship. Finally, the very liberal countries have a CPI value of six and
include the United States, the United Kingdom, or Australia. They feature citizenship by place of
birth, shorter residency requirements, and allow for dual citizenship.
B. Sample
We draw on a variety of original data to implement our empirical strategies. The basis for our sample
is the data compiled by Hainmueller and Hangartner (2013) who extracted from municipal archives the
voting leaflets and outcomes for all 2,225 applicants who faced naturalization referendums between 1970
and 2003 in all the 46 ballot box municipalities who used secret ballot referendums with voting leaflets.
The municipalities are located in seven different cantons in the German-speaking region. As shown
in Hainmueller and Hangartner (2013) the municipalities are fairly typical of municipalities in the
German speaking region of Switzerland. The time period covered varies somewhat due to differences
in data availability, but for most municipalities, the data contains all naturalization referendums from
2003 going back to the 1970s and 1980s.
21The only difference to Howard’s (2005) coding is that we allocate Germany 1 point for its partial allowance of
birthright citizenship.
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We conducted the survey between October 3, 2011 and September 19, 2014. The interviews were
conducted by native speakers in multiple languages including all of Swiss official languages and all
the major immigrant languages including Turkish, Serbo-Croatian, Italian, Portuguese, and English.
All interviewers completed a standardized training that included mock interviews and recruitments to
assure a high quality of the data.
We obtained a cumulative response rate 3 (RR3) as defined by the American Association for Public
Opinion Research of 34.5% (45.9% for the sample of competitive applicants who came within a ± 15
vote margin of winning).
C. Attrition
Figure B.1 displays the non-response rate across the vote share margin. The dots display binned
averages with 95% confidence intervals. The red and blue fitted lines from a Loess smoother summarize
the average non-response rate for a given vote share margin on the left and the right side of the
threshold, respectively. For all competitive applicants, the response rate is constant and between
about 40% and 55% for most bins. Importantly, there is no noticeable difference between applicants
who barely lost and barely won their first referendum. Note that this response rate is much higher
than for comparable surveys. A recent phone survey conducted among voters in Switzerland yielded
a response rate (RR3) of 12.8% (Bechtel et al. 2015). A typical study conducted via Knowledge
Networks, widely regarded as one of the best probability based online panels in the United States,
yields an RR3 of 2.8% (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015). In our case the primary reason for non-
response was that we could not get a valid address. Of the cases where we could get a valid address
and therefore were able to contact the applicant, 88% participated in the survey.
Figure B.1: Response Rate across the Vote Margin (95% Confidence Intervals)
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Table B.1 provides further evidence that applicants who were successfully interviewed are not
different from those that we could not contact, have died, emigrated, or declined to be interviewed.
In particular, we examine whether the interaction of baseline covariates and the instrument (more
than 50% vote share in first referendum) predicts attrition. We do not find that scoring above 50% in
the first referendum led to a sample selection bias in terms of the characteristics of individuals who
completed the interview.
Table B.1: Instrument Interaction Test for Selective Attrition
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome Interviewed Interviewed Interviewed Interviewed
Above 50% 0.02 -0.55 0.03 -0.57
(0.04) (0.35) (0.06) (0.36)
Margin -0.00 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Margin × Above 50% 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Controls
Applicant Characteristics
Country of Origin X X X X
Sociodemographics X X X X
Interactions with Above 50 %
Country of Origin X X
Sociodemographics X X
Fixed Effects
Time period X X X X
Municipality X X X X
Parameters tested 1 35 1 35
F -test 0.20 1.33 0.18 1.31
p-value 0.65 0.10 0.67 0.11
Observations 1025 1025 1025 1025
Note: Table shows rrdinary least squares regression of an indicator for interviewed applicants on a binary instrument
(=1 if vote share margin above 50%). Model (1) tests for a significant effect of the instrument and controls for country
of origin, sociodemographics and fixed effects for each time period and municipality. Model (2) similarly tests for a
significant effect of the instrument and adds all 34 interactions of the instrument with the applicant characteristics.
Model (3) uses the same specification as model (1) but additionally controls for the vote share margin and the
interaction of the margin with the instrument. Model (4) uses the same specification as model (2) but additionally
controls for the vote share margin and the interaction of the margin with the instrument. Sample: all applicants
within a window ±15%. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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D. Social Integration Scale
We use a polychoric principal component analysis (PCA) to construct the social integration scale from
the four outcome questions. Polychoric PCA has the advantage that it can handle binary and categorial
variables. To extract the principal components, polychoric PCA uses the linear combinations of the
polychoric correlation matrix of the input variables, rather than the variables themselves (Olsson 1979).
To create the social integration scale we extract the first principal component, which accounts for 45%
of the total variance (Eigenvalue = 1.80). For the higher-order components the explanatory power
drops sharply: The second component accounts for 22 % (Eigenvalue = 0.89), the third component
for 20% (Eigenvalue = 0.79, and the fourth component for 13% of the total variance (Eigenvalue =
0.52). We rescale the first principal component to have a mean zero and standard deviation of .5 for
interpretability.
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E. Descriptive Statistics
Tables B.2 and B.3 display the descriptive statistics for key covariates and outcome items for the sample
of all applicants and the main estimation sample of competitive applicants who obtained enough ‘yes’
votes to come within a ±15% window around the threshold of winning. Most of the applicants in the
competitive sample are immigrants from the former Yugoslavia and Turkey who are often considered
to be among the most marginalized immigrant groups in Switzerland. On average, applicants have
been living in Switzerland for about 19 years at the time of the their naturalization referendum, but
there is a wide variation ranging from 12 to 44 years. The average age at the time of the survey is
about 35 years, with a range of 17 to 72 years.
Looking at the social integration items we see that the majority of immigrants have plans to stay in
Switzerland for good, but there is also a sizable fraction of immigrants who have plans to leave or are
unsure about there long term settlement plans. About 20% of immigrants report being discriminated
against in Switzerland and on average only 21% report being a member of a social club. For the
newspaper readership the average is about four on the five point scale, so slightly skewed towards
immigrants reading mostly Swiss as opposed to foreign newspapers from their home country.
Table B.2: Descriptive Statistics for all Interviewed Applicants
Variable Observations Mean SD Min Max
Male 768 0.71 0.45 0.00 1.00
Age 765 51.36 14.95 23.00 89.00
Low skilled 618 0.43 0.49 0.00 1.00
Residency years at time of referendum 654 20.16 6.72 12.00 47.00
Residency years at time of survey 767 36.83 10.50 17.00 82.00
Northern & Western Europe 768 0.17 0.37 0.00 1.00
Southern European Countries 768 0.15 0.35 0.00 1.00
Central & Eastern Europe 768 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00
(former) Yugoslavia 768 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00
Turkey 768 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00
Other Non-European Countries 768 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00
Asian Countries 768 0.05 0.23 0.00 1.00
Percent yes votes 768 58.69 14.70 12.16 95.74
Above 50% 768 0.71 0.45 0.00 1.00
Naturalized 768 0.86 0.34 0.00 1.00
Integration Scale 740 0.00 0.50 -1.60 0.76
Plans to stay in Switzerland 762 0.66 0.61 -1.00 1.00
Perceived discrimination 758 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00
Club membership 768 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00
Newspaper readership 754 4.05 0.88 1.00 5.00
Distrust for the local authorities 757 0.25 0.19 0.00 1.00
Distrust for the judicial system 748 0.25 0.21 0.00 1.00
Distrust for other people 761 0.38 0.21 0.00 1.00
Note: Male, age, skill level, residency years at time of referendum, and origin are measured at
the time of the referendum from the voting leaflets and the percent yes votes and above 50 %
from the municipal voting records. Residency years at time of survey, naturalized, integration
scale, plans to stay in Switzerland, perceived discrimination, club membership, newspaper
readership, and distrust are measured in our immigrant survey.
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Table B.3: Descriptive Statistics for Competitive Applicants
Variable Observations Mean SD Min Max
Male 474 0.72 0.45 0.00 1.00
Age 472 49.72 14.49 23.00 84.00
Low skilled 378 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00
Residency years at time of referendum 428 19.20 5.70 12.00 44.00
Residency years at time of survey 474 34.91 9.05 17.00 72.00
Northern & Western Europe 474 0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00
Southern European Countries 474 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00
Central & Eastern Europe 474 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00
(former) Yugoslavia 474 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00
Turkey 474 0.25 0.44 0.00 1.00
Other Non-European Countries 474 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00
Asian Countries 474 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00
Percent yes votes 474 52.02 8.02 35.13 64.94
Above 50% 474 0.60 0.49 0.00 1.00
Naturalized 474 0.83 0.38 0.00 1.00
Integration Scale 459 -0.05 0.51 -1.48 0.76
Plans to stay in Switzerland 470 0.62 0.64 -1.00 1.00
Perceived discrimination 469 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00
Club membership 474 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00
Newspaper readership 467 4.00 0.89 1.00 5.00
Distrust for the local authorities 468 0.24 0.19 0.00 1.00
Distrust for the judicial system 462 0.25 0.21 0.00 1.00
Distrust for other people 469 0.38 0.20 0.00 1.00
Note: Male, age, skill level, residency years at time of referendum, and origin are measured at
the time of the referendum from the voting leaflets and the percent yes votes and above 50 %
from the municipal voting records. Residency years at time of survey, naturalized, integration
scale, plans to stay in Switzerland, perceived discrimination, club membership, newspaper
readership, and distrust are measured in our immigrant survey.
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F. Balance Tests for Fuzzy RD Design
Figure B.2: Balance Tests for Fuzzy RD Design
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Every dot shows the p-value of a placebo fuzzy RD effect estimated for each pre-treatment covariate at the threshold of winning
obtained from our benchmark local linear regression within a ±15% vote share margin. The red line indicates the 5% and the blue
line the 10% level of significance, respectively.
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G. First Stage Results
Table B.4 shows that the effect of winning or losing the first referendum on the probability of nat-
uralization. We find that winning versus barely losing the first referendum increased the probability
of naturalization by about .28 to 42. The F -test for the strength of the instrument well exceeds the
standard threshold of 10 (Stock and Yogo 2005).
Table B.4: First Stage Regression Estimates
Model (1) (2) (3)
Outcome NaturalizedNaturalizedNaturalized
Above 50% 0.42 0.28 0.29
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
Country of Origin X X
Sociodemographics X X
Time period Fixed Effects X X
Municipality Fixed Effects X X
Margin X X
F -test 94.66 20.66 20.21
Observations 471 474 471
Note: Table shows ordinary least squares regression of naturalization measure on
the binary instrument (=1 if vote share margin above 50%). Model (1) shows the
first stage results for the IV model where we adjust for country of origin, all so-
ciodemographics (gender, age, children, marital status, education, occupation skill
level, years since immigration, refugee status, language competencies, integration
status), and fixed effects for each time period and municipality. Model (2) shows
first stage results for the fuzzy RD model without covariates where we just include
the vote share margin. Model (3) shows first stage results for the fuzzy RD model
with covariates where we add country of origin, all sociodemographics, fixed ef-
fects for each time period and municipality, and the vote share margin. Sample:
all applicants within a vote margin window of ± 15%. Robust standard errors in
parentheses.
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H. Main Results
Table B.5: 2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Naturalization on Long-Term Social Integration
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outcomes Integration
Scale
Stay in
Switzerland
Report Dis-
crimination
Club
Membership
Swiss
Newspapers
Naturalized 0.51 0.49 -0.28 0.13 0.51
(0.13) (0.17) (0.12) (0.11) (0.22)
Country of Origin X X X X X
Sociodemographics X X X X X
Time period FE X X X X X
Municipality FE X X X X X
Observations 456 467 466 471 464
Note: Table shows instrumental variables regressions of outcomes (1) – (5) on naturalization status, instrumented by getting more
(less) than 50 % of “yes” votes in first referendum, for all applicants within a ±15% window. All models control for country of origin,
all sociodemographics (gender, age, children, marital status, education, occupation skill level, years since immigration, refugee status,
language competencies, integration status), and fixed effects for each time period and municipality. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table B.6: Fuzzy RDD Estimates of the Effect of Naturalization on Long-Term Social Integration
(without Covariates)
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outcomes Integration
Scale
Stay in
Switzerland
Report Dis-
crimination
Club
Membership
Swiss
Newspapers
Naturalized 0.74 0.87 -0.31 0.02 0.88
(0.35) (0.43) (0.28) (0.24) (0.58)
Margin -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
Margin × Above 50% 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
Observations 459 470 469 474 467
Note: Table shows instrumental variables regressions of outcomes (1) – (5) on naturalization status, instrumented by getting more (less)
than 50 % of “yes” votes in first referendum, for all applicants within a ±15% window. All models control for the vote margin and the
interaction of the vote margin with the instrument. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table B.7: Fuzzy RDD Estimates of the Effect of Naturalization on Long-Term Social Integration
(with Covariates)
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outcomes Integration
Scale
Stay in
Switzerland
Report Dis-
crimination
Club
Membership
Swiss
Newspapers
Naturalized 0.63 0.63 -0.37 0.05 0.63
(0.31) (0.41) (0.27) (0.22) (0.52)
Margin 0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.00 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
Margin × Above 50% -0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.01 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
Country of Origin X X X X X
Sociodemographics X X X X X
Time period FE X X X X X
Municipality FE X X X X X
Observations 456 467 466 471 464
Note: Table shows instrumental variables regressions (1) – (5) on naturalization status, instrumented by getting more (less) than 50 % of
“yes” votes in first referendum, for all applicants within a ±15% window. All models control for the vote margin and the interaction of the
vote margin with the instrument, country of origin, all sociodemographics (gender, age, children, marital status, education, occupation
skill level, years since immigration, refugee status, language competencies, integration status), and fixed effects for each time period and
municipality. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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I. Secondary Outcomes
Table B.8: Effect of Naturalization on Long-Term Distrust
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Outcome: Distrust for the judicial system local authorities people judicial system local authorities people judicial system authorities people
Naturalized -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.03 -0.02
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.13) (0.12)
Margin 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Margin × Above 50% -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Country of Origin X X X X X X
Sociodemographics X X X X X X
Time period FE X X X X X X
Municipality FE X X X X X X
Observations 459 465 466 459 465 466 462 468 469
Note: Table shows instrumental variables regressions of measures of distrust for the (i) judicial system (Models 1, 4, 7), (ii) local authorities (Models 2, 5, 8), and (iii)
people (Models 3, 6, 9), on naturalization status, instrumented by getting more (less) than 50 % of “yes” votes in first referendum, for all applicants within a ±15% window.
Models 1-3 are instrumental variables regressions controlling for country of origin, all sociodemographics (gender, age, children, marital status, education, occupation skill
level, years since immigration, refugee status, language competencies, integration status), and fixed effects for each time period and municipality. Models 4-6 are fuzzy
RDD regressions without covariates that control for the vote margin and the interaction of the vote margin with the instrument. Models 7-9 are fuzzy RDD regressions
with covariates that control for country of origin, all sociodemographics, fixed effects for each time period and municipality, and the vote margin and the interaction of
the vote margin with the instrument. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table B.9: 2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Naturalization on Distrust for Applicants from (Former)
Yugoslavia or Turkey
Model (1) (2) (3)
Outcome: Distrust for the judicial system local authorities people
Naturalized -0.05 -0.06 0.06
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Country of Origin X X X
Sociodemographics X X X
Time period FE X X X
Municipality FE X X X
Observations 314 316 316
Note: Table shows instrumental variables regressions of outcomes (1) – (3) on naturalization status, instrumented
by getting more (less) than 50 % of “yes” votes in first referendum, for all applicants from (former) Yugoslavia
or Turkey and within a ±15% window. All models control for country of origin, all sociodemographics (gender,
age, children, marital status, education, occupation skill level, years since immigration, refugee status, language
competencies, integration status), and fixed effects for each time period and municipality. Robust standard errors
in parentheses.
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Table B.10: 2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Naturalization on Distrust for Applicants not from
(Former) Yugoslavia or Turkey
Model (1) (2) (3)
Outcome: Distrust for the judicial system local authorities people
Naturalized 0.02 0.11 0.06
(0.11) (0.09) (0.11)
Country of Origin X X X
Sociodemographics X X X
Time period FE X X X
Municipality FE X X X
Observations 145 149 150
Note: Table shows instrumental variables regressions of outcomes (1) – (3) on naturalization status, instrumented
by getting more (less) than 50 % of “yes” votes in first referendum, for all applicants from (former) Yugoslavia
or Turkey and within a ±15% window. All models control for country of origin, all sociodemographics (gender,
age, children, marital status, education, occupation skill level, years since immigration, refugee status, language
competencies, integration status), and fixed effects for each time period and municipality. Robust standard errors
in parentheses.
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J. Subgroup Analysis
Table B.11: 2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Naturalization for Applicants from (Former) Yugoslavia
or Turkey
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outcomes Integration
Scale
Stay in
Switzerland
Report Dis-
crimination
Club
Membership
Swiss
Newspapers
Naturalized 0.52 0.50 -0.30 0.14 0.57
(0.15) (0.23) (0.14) (0.13) (0.27)
Country of Origin X X X X X
Sociodemographics X X X X X
Time period FE X X X X X
Municipality FE X X X X X
Observations 311 316 315 318 315
Note: Table shows instrumental variables regressions of outcomes (1) – (5) on naturalization status, instrumented by getting more (less)
than 50 % of “yes” votes in first referendum, for all applicants not from (former) Yugoslavia or Turkey and within a ±15% window. All
models control for country of origin, all sociodemographics (gender, age, children, marital status, education, occupation skill level, years
since immigration, refugee status, language competencies, integration status), and fixed effects for each time period and municipality.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table B.12: 2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Naturalization for Applicants not from (Former) Yugoslavia
or Turkey
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outcomes Integration
Scale
Stay in
Switzerland
Report Dis-
crimination
Club
Membership
Swiss
Newspapers
Naturalized 0.06 0.11 -0.06 0.27 -0.13
(0.18) (0.19) (0.17) (0.20) (0.38)
Country of Origin X X X X X
Sociodemographics X X X X X
Time period FE X X X X X
Municipality FE X X X X X
Observations 145 151 151 153 149
Note: Table shows instrumental variables regressions of outcomes (1) – (5) on naturalization status, instrumented by getting more (less)
than 50 % of “yes” votes in first referendum, for all applicants not from (former) Yugoslavia or Turkey and within a ±15% window. All
models control for country of origin, all sociodemographics (gender, age, children, marital status, education, occupation skill level, years
since immigration, refugee status, language competencies, integration status), and fixed effects for each time period and municipality.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table B.13: 2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Naturalization for Applicants born in Switzerland
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outcomes Integration
Scale
Stay in
Switzerland
Report Dis-
crimination
Club
Membership
Swiss
Newspapers
Naturalized 0.09 0.02 -0.20 0.08 0.03
(0.18) (0.25) (0.15) (0.18) (0.29)
Country of Origin X X X X X
Sociodemographics X X X X X
Time period FE X X X X X
Municipality FE X X X X X
Observations 95 95 95 95 95
Note: Table shows instrumental variables regressions of outcomes (1) – (5) on naturalization status, instrumented by getting more (less)
than 50 % of “yes” votes in first referendum, for all applicants who are born in Switzerland and within a ±15% window. All models
control for country of origin, all sociodemographics (gender, age, children, marital status, education, occupation skill level, years since
immigration, refugee status, language competencies, integration status), and fixed effects for each time period and municipality. Robust
standard errors in parentheses.
Table B.14: 2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Naturalization for Applicants not born in Switzerland
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outcomes Integration
Scale
Stay in
Switzerland
Report Dis-
crimination
Club
Membership
Swiss
Newspapers
Naturalized 0.59 0.72 -0.26 0.06 0.53
(0.17) (0.23) (0.14) (0.14) (0.28)
Country of Origin X X X X X
Sociodemographics X X X X X
Time period FE X X X X X
Municipality FE X X X X X
Observations 361 372 371 376 369
Note: Table shows instrumental variables regressions of outcomes (1) – (5) on naturalization status, instrumented by getting more (less)
than 50 % of “yes” votes in first referendum, for all applicants who are not born in Switzerland and within a ±15% window. All models
control for country of origin, all sociodemographics (gender, age, children, marital status, education, occupation skill level, years since
immigration, refugee status, language competencies, integration status), and fixed effects for each time period and municipality. Robust
standard errors in parentheses.
Table B.15: 2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Naturalization for Applicants not born in Switzerland or
from (Former) Yugoslavia or Turkey by Skill Level
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome Integration Scale
Sample Not Born in Switzerland From Yugoslavia or Turkey
Skill level Medium/High Low Medium/High Low
Naturalized 0.55 0.46 0.51 0.60
(0.22) (0.28) (0.19) (0.35) )
Country of Origin X X X X
Sociodemographics X X X X
Observations 155 149 113 132
Note: Table shows instrumental variables regressions of social integration scale on naturalization status, instru-
mented by getting more (less) than 50 % of “yes” votes in first referendum, for all applicants within a ±15% win-
dow. Model (1) focuses on medium and high skilled applicants not born in Switzerland; Model (2) on low skilled
applicants not born in Switzerland; Model (3) on medium and high skilled applicants from (former) Yugoslavia or
Turkey; Model (4) on low skilled applicants from (former) Yugoslavia or Turkey. All models control for country
of origin, all sociodemographics (gender, age, children, marital status, education, years since immigration, refugee
status, language competencies, integration status) and are subsetted by occupational skill level. Robust standard
errors in parentheses.
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K. Robustness tests for different bandwidths
Figures B.3 and B.4 show the estimated effects for various bandwidth to trim the estimation sample
based on the margin of victory.
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Figure B.3: Robustness Tests for Different Bandwidths IV
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This figure shows the estimated effect of naturalization on each outcome as a function of the bandwidth for the instrumental variables regression. The blue
dots indicate the point estimates based on the sample within the corresponding value of the forcing variable (margin), and blue and dark grey lines the
90% and 95% confidence intervals, respectively. Outcomes: social integration scale (std=0.5); plans to stay in Switzerland (1/0/-1); discrimination (1/0);
membership in social club (1/0); reading Swiss newspapers (5-1). The following covariates are used as controls: gender, age, children, marital status,
education, occupation skill level, years since immigration, refugee status, language competencies, integration status, country of origin, and fixed effects
for each municipality and time period.
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Figure B.4: Robustness Tests for Different Bandwidths Fuzzy RDD
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This figure shows the estimated effect of naturalization on each outcome as a function of the bandwidth for the fuzzy RDD regression. The blue dots
indicate the point estimates based on the sample within the corresponding value of the forcing variable (margin), and blue and dark grey lines the 90%
and 95% confidence intervals, respectively. Outcomes: social integration scale (std=0.5); plans to stay in Switzerland (1/0/-1); discrimination (1/0);
membership in social club (1/0); reading Swiss newspapers (5-1). The following covariates are used as controls: gender, age, children, marital status,
education, occupation skill level, years since immigration, refugee status, language competencies, integration status, country of origin, and fixed effects
for each municipality and time period.
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L. Early vs Late Naturalization
L.1. First Stage: Early vs Late Naturalization
Table B.16 shows that the effect of narrowly winning or losing the first referendum on early versus late
naturalization. We find that winning over losing the first referendum increases the number of years
that applicants are Swiss by about 48 percent (which amounts to roughly four more years over the
average) and a decrease of .27 in the probability of being Swiss for more than 13 years (the sample
median used as the cutpoint).
Table B.16: First-Stage Effect of Winning First Referendum on Number of Years with Swiss Citizenship
Mean outcome .48 2.59
(1) (2)
Outcome Years Swiss
≥ 13
Years Swiss
(Logged)
Above 50% 0.27 0.48
(0.06) (0.07)
Country of Origin X X
Sociodemographics X X
Residency in Switzerland X X
Time period Fixed Effects X X
Municipality Fixed Effects X X
Window size ±15% ±15%
Stock and Yogo F -test 20.73 48.81
p-value 0.00 0.00
Observations 390 390
Note: Table shows two-stage least squares regressions of the number of years
with the Swiss passport on a binary instrument (=1 if vote share margin above
50 %). Model (1) shows the first stage results for the log of the years with the
Swiss passport, model (2) shows the same regression but uses a binary indicator
for more (less) than 13 years with the Swiss passport. Both models control
for applicant’s country of origin, sociodemographics, a categorical indicator
for residency at time of interview, and fixed effects for each time period and
municipality. Sample: all applicants within a window ± 15%. Robust standard
errors in parentheses.
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L.2. Treatment Effects: Early vs Late Naturalization
Table B.17: 2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Early Versus Late Naturalization (Continuous Treatment)
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outcomes Integration
Scale
Stay in
Switzerland
Report Dis-
crimination
Club
Membership
Swiss
Newspapers
Years Swiss (Logged) 0.36 0.43 -0.12 0.11 0.40
(0.13) (0.16) (0.12) (0.11) (0.22)
Country of origin X X X X X
Sociodemographics X X X X X
Residency in Switzerland X X X X X
Time period FE X X X X X
Municipality FE X X X X X
Observations 379 387 387 390 384
Note: Table shows instrumental variables regressions of outcomes (1) – (5) on log of the number of years with the Swiss passport,
instrumented by getting more (less) than 50 % of “yes” votes in first referendum, for all naturalized applicants within a ±15% window.
All models control for country of origin, sociodemographic, a categorical indicator for residency at time of interview, and fixed effects for
each time period and municipality. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table B.18: 2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Early Versus Late Naturalization (Binary Treatment)
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outcomes Integration
Scale
Stay in
Switzerland
Report Dis-
crimination
Club
Membership
Swiss
Newspapers
Years Swiss ≥ 13 0.64 0.76 -0.21 0.20 0.72
(0.25) (0.31) (0.22) (0.21) (0.42)
Country of origin X X X X X
Sociodemographics X X X X X
Residency in Switzerland X X X X X
Time period FE X X X X X
Municipality FE X X X X X
Observations 379 387 387 390 384
Note: Table shows instrumental variables regressions of outcomes (1) – (5) on a binary indicator for more (less) than 13 years with the
Swiss passport, instrumented by getting more (less) than 50 % of “yes” votes in first referendum, for all naturalized applicants within a
±15% window. All models control for country of origin, sociodemographic, a categorical indicator for residency at time of interview, and
fixed effects for each time period and municipality. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Figure B.5 displays the first-stage estimates of the difference in the probability of being naturalized for
a given number of years for immigrants who won or lost their first referendum. We can see that the
first stage estimates are strongest for the years 7 to 14, where the compliance rate is between 25 % and
45 %. For this period, Figure B.6 displays the second-stage estimates of the effect of being naturalized
for a given number of years on the social integration scale. We find that the effects of these binary
indicators of early versus late naturalization are similar regardless of the precise cut-point we use and
are significant and large in substantive terms; the equivalent of a full standard deviation increase on
the social integration scale.
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Figure B.5: Effect of Winning First Referendum on Early vs Late Naturalization
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Note: The figure shows the first stage estimates of the difference in the probability of being naturalized for longer or equal to the number of years on the x-axis
for immigrants who won or lost their first naturalization referendum. The solid black line shows the point estimates, and the shaded area the 95 % confidence
interval based on robust standard errors.
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Figure B.6: Effect of Early vs Late Naturalization on Social Integration Scale
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Note: The figure shows second stage estimates of the effect of being naturalized for longer or equal to the number of years on the x-axis on the social integration
scale. The solid black line shows the point estimates, and the shaded area the 95 % confidence interval based on robust standard errors.
L.3. Sensitivity Analysis: Early vs Late Naturalization
One potential concern with our identification strategy to estimate the effect of early versus late nat-
uralization is that the group of immigrants that was naturalized in the first referendum consists of
both always-takers, i.e. immigrants that if rejected the first time would successfully apply later, and
compliers, i.e. immigrants that remain unnaturalized if rejected the first time, while the group of re-
jected applicants that was naturalized in a later attempt consists, by definition, of only always-takers.
Note that the compliance groups here are defined with regard to naturalization per se, not early versus
late naturalization. In order to gauge the sensitivity of our results to differences between the potential
outcomes of compliers and always-takers, we inspect the standard two-stage least-squares IV estimator:
α =
E[Y |Z = 1, X]− E[Y |Z = 0, X]
E[D|Z = 1, X]− E[D|Z = 0, X] , (1)
where Y is the social integration scale, D is the log of the years with the Swiss passport, and Z = 1
if applicant passed the first naturalization referendum and 0 otherwise. While E[Y |Z = 1, X] and
E[D|Z = 1, X] consist of both compliers, C, and always-takers, A, that were naturalized in their first
referendum, E[Y |Z = 0, X] and E[D|Z = 0, X] consist only of always-takers that were naturalized in
a later attempt. Immigrants that were rejected in the first referendum but have obtained citizenship
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by the time of interview are, by definition, alwaus-takers, hence E[Y |Z = 0, X] = E[Y |Z = 0, X,A]
and E[D|Z = 0, X] = E[D|Z = 0, X,A]. If the potential outcomes are different for always-takers
and compliers, α may exhibit bias. To inspect the sensitivity to this bias, we rewrite the first term
E[Y |Z = 1, X] as a weighted average of always-takers and compliers:
E[Y |Z = 1, X] = E[Y |Z = 1, X,A] Pr(A) + E[Y |Z = 1, X, C] Pr(C) (2)
and express this equation in terms of always-takers:
E[Y |Z = 1, X,A] = E[Y |Z = 1, X]− E[Y1|Z = 1, X, C] Pr(C)
Pr(A)
(3)
Under the simplifying assumption that the first stage effect of naturalization in the first attempt on
post-naturalization residency years is the same for both always-takers and compliers, i.e. E[D|Z =
1, X,A] = E[D|Z = 1, X, C], we can write equation 1 in terms of always-takers only:
α˜ =
E[Y |Z = 1, X,A]− E[Y |Z = 0, X,A]
E[D|Z = 1, X,A]− E[D|Z = 0, X,A] (4)
=
E[Y |Z=1,X]−E[Y |Z=1,X,C] Pr(C)
Pr(A)
− E[Y |Z = 0, X,A]
E[D|Z = 1, X,A]− E[D|Z = 0, X,A]
Since we cannot distinguish always-takers and compliers in the group that passed the first referendum,
we also cannot identify E[Y |Z = 1, X, C] or α˜ directly. However, we can employ a sensitivity analysis
that tells us how much bigger (smaller) E[Y |Z = 1, X, C] than E[Y |Z = 1, X,A] would have to be in
order to render α˜ i) insignificant or ii) equal to 0. We incorporate the sensitivity parameter
γ =
E[Y |Z = 1, X, C]
E[Y |Z = 1, X,A] (5)
directly into equation 4:
α˜(γ) =
E[Y |Z=1,X]−γE[Y |Z=1,X,A] Pr(C)
Pr(A)
− E[Y |Z = 0, X,A]
E[D|Z = 1, X,A]− E[D|Z = 0, X,A] (6)
such that we can calculate the value of γ that gives us α˜(γ)/SE(α˜) = 1.96 and α˜(γ) = 0, respectively.
By plugging in the sample analogues (of subsection E) in equation 6, we produce Figure B.7 and find
that it would take γ > 3.15 to render α˜(γ) insignificant and γ > 8 to turn α˜(γ) = 0.
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Figure B.7: Sensitivity Analysis for the Effect of Early versus Late Naturalization on Long Term
Social Integration
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Note: Sensitivity analysis for the adjusted effect estimates with robust 95% confidence intervals based on a two-stage least squares regression
for different values of gamma.
We believe the integration potential of always-takers to be, if anything, higher than that of com-
pliers, such that γ ≤ 1, because unlike compliers, always-takers were willing to repeatedly invest in
their naturalization. Therefore, we think that it is extremely unlikely that the average of the social
integration scale is more than three times larger for the latter compared to the former group.
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Response Memo 
 
“APSR-D-15-00672R1 Catalyst or Crown: Does Naturalization Promote the Long-
Term Social Integration of Immigrants?” 
 
This memo documents the changes we made to the paper in response to comments 
from the two reviewers as well as the editor. We like to thank the reviewers and the 
editor, again, for their high quality feedback, which has further improved the paper. 
Below we describe the revisions point-by-point.  
 
Editorial Remarks and Reviewer #2: 
 
R2 encouraged us to further explore the heterogeneity in the effects of naturalization 
to better understand why naturalization is more beneficial for more marginalized 
immigrant groups. In particular, R2 encouraged us to think more about a test we could 
add to better distinguish between a personal investment story and a discrimination 
story. We think this is a great suggestion.  
 
As with any study, there are limits to what we can do in terms of pinning down the 
precise mechanisms given the decreasing sample sizes we encounter when breaking 
the sample down along further dimensions. However, one informative test we can 
examine here is whether the effects of naturalization within the marginalized 
immigrants’ groups vary by skill level. As indicated by R2, if the heterogeneity in the 
naturalization effect is driven predominantly by a personal investment mechanism 
then we would expect that among marginalized immigrants groups, the integration 
returns from naturalization are higher for immigrants in low skilled occupations 
because in the absence of naturalization they face more resource constraints than 
immigrants in medium and high skilled occupations who tend to have more resources 
in the form of higher educational backgrounds, better language skills, and other 
economic advantages despite belonging to the same marginalized origin group. In 
contrast, if the heterogeneity in the naturalization effect is predominantly driven by a 
mechanism where naturalization mitigates the discrimination from natives then we 
would expect that the integration returns to naturalization are fairly similar across low 
and high skilled immigrants since they belong to the same marginalized group and are 
at the risk of discrimination by natives.  
 
When computing this test, we find that the returns to naturalization are indeed very 
similar across skill levels. The fact that within the marginalized groups immigrants 
benefit equally from naturalization despite the differences in their skill levels suggests 
that---at least in our context---the variation in the effects of naturalization on 
integration might be more driven by reducing the discrimination from natives rather 
than enabling immigrants to overcome resource constraints. We have added this new 
test and explanation in the main text (page 31-33 and Figure 7). There we also note 
that this evidence is mostly suggestive given that we are dealing with increasingly 
small sample sizes when breaking the data down by further dimensions. Moreover, 
we lack high frequency measures that would allow us to directly capture how personal 
investments respond to naturalization over time. As we also emphasize in the 
conclusion, further research is clearly needed to better understand how the 
mechanisms through which naturalization propels integration might vary across 
groups, time, and local context. We thank R2 for this great suggestion.  
Revision Memo
 
In response to R2 and the editor we also added more references to qualitative studies 
that have used interviews in which immigrants explain how citizenship affects them 
(pages 7 and 8). Interestingly, in some of this work, such as Wunderlich (2000), the 
idea of being recognized by natives as equal also features prominently in the 
interviews with newly naturalized immigrants. 
 
In response to R2 we have removed the cite to Kymlicka. Note that in the previous 
version we cited Kymlicka’s (1995) book when we referred to the concept of 
integration which in Kymlicka’s work is thought of as a two-way street that requires 
adaptation by the newcomers but also the host society of remove prejudice, barriers, 
and discrimination. However, we agreed that this might be confusing given that 
Kymlicka also talks about many other issues and therefore it makes more sense to 
remove the citation and stick with other pieces that directly focus on the meaning of 
integration (such as Castles et al. 2002). 
 
Reviewer #3: 
 
In response to R3 we have clarified (on page 7-8) that naturalization does not confer 
any additional social rights in Switzerland beyond the rights enjoyed by permanent 
residents who do not naturalize. We thank R3 for this excellent suggestion. 
 
